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Abstract 
We generalize the classic concept of compensating variation and the welfare compensation 
principle to a general equilibrium environment with distortionary taxes. We derive in closed-form 
the solution to the problem of designing a tax reform that compensates the welfare gains and 
losses induced by an arbitrary economic disruption. In partial equilibrium, average taxes simply 
increase or decrease to counteract the revenue gains or losses caused by the disruption. In 
general equilibrium, the compensation features three elements that depart from this benchmark 
and respectively account for (i) the incidence of the initial exogenous shock, and the fact that the 
tax reform itself induces indirect welfare effects caused by (ii) the non-constant marginal product 
of labor and (iii) the skill complementarities in production. This leads to a progressive 
compensating tax reform, with average tax rates increasing at a rate given by the ratio of the 
elasticity of labor demand and the elasticity of labor supply net of the rate of progressivity of the 
pre-existing tax code. We also derive a closed form formula for the fiscal surplus of the wage 
disruption and the compensation, thus generalizing the traditional Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Finally, 
we apply our formula to the compensation of automation: in the U.S., one additional robot per 
thousand workers requires a reduction (resp., increase) in the average tax rate at the 10th (resp., 
90th) percentile of the income distribution equal to 2 percentage points (resp., 0.5 pp). 
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Introduction
In this paper we generalize the classic concept of compensating variation and the
welfare compensation principle to a general equilibrium environment in which only
distortionary taxes are available.
Consider a disruption in the economy, for example, an inﬂow of immigration or a
change in technology, that impacts the distribution of workers' wages. This economic
shock generally creates winners and losers, i.e., welfare gains for some individuals and
welfare losses for others. The welfare compensation problem consists of designing a
reform of the tax-and-transfer system that oﬀsets these losses by redistributing the
gains of the winners. The traditional public ﬁnance literature (Kaldor [1939], Hicks
[1939, 1940]) gives a straightforward answer to the welfare compensation problem. In
an economy where type-dependent lump-sum taxes are available, the tax reform that
redistributes the welfare gains and losses from the economic shock simply consists of
raising (resp., lowering) in a lump-sum way the tax liability of agents whose welfare
increases (resp., decreases) from the disruption, up to the point where everyone is
exactly as well oﬀ as before the change. This standard Kaldor-Hicks approach is
ﬂawed, however. First, because of asymmetric information, the only tax instrument
at the disposal of the government, the income tax, is distortionary (Mirrlees [1971]),
so that agents' labor supplies adjust in response to the tax change. Second, we
argue that it is important to design the tax reform in an environment that explicitly
accounts for the fact that wages are endogenously determined in general equilibrium.
Consider for example an immigration inﬂow, i.e., an exogenous (relative) increase
in the total labor supply of a given skill. This disruption lowers the wage of agents
with the same skill because the marginal product of labor is decreasing and raises
the wage of those whose skills are complementary in production. In this situation,
therefore, it is clear that immigration ﬂows have non-trivial welfare consequences only
because of the general equilibrium forces. Similarly, the impact of automation on
inequality can be understood as a race between education and technology, whereby
movements in relative wages are driven by the changes in the relative supply and
demand of skills. Now suppose that the government implements a tax reform that
aims at compensating the welfare of agents whose wage is adversely impacted by the
disruption. Since the only available policy tools are distortionary taxes, such a reform
aﬀects the agents' labor supply choices. By the same general equilibrium forces as we
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just described, these labor supply adjustments impact in turn individuals' wages, and
hence their utility. These welfare implications need to be themselves compensated
using the distortionary tax code, leading to an a priori complex ﬁxed point problem.
We start by analyzing the welfare compensation problem in a partial equilibrium
environment where wages are exogenous. We show that the design of the compen-
sating tax reform which brings every agent's utility back to its pre-disruption level
is simple, even when only distortionary taxes are available. The key insight here is
that individual utility is only aﬀected by the average tax rates of the reform  that
is, the changes in marginal tax rates do not impact welfare. This follows from an
envelope theorem argument: the marginal tax rate that the individual faces aﬀects
his indirect utility only through his optimal labor supply decision, so that the cor-
responding welfare eﬀect is second-order. As a consequence, it is straightforward to
show (Proposition 1) that a suitably designed adjustment in the average tax rate 
namely, one that exactly cancels out the income gain or loss caused by the exogenous
disruption  is suﬃcient to achieve welfare compensation.
The analysis becomes signiﬁcantly more complicated when distortionary taxes are
coupled with the general equilibrium considerations. In this case, despite the envelope
theorem, the endogenous changes in labor supply do matter for welfare, through their
impact on wages that result from the decreasing returns and the complementarities in
production. Therefore, in general equilibrium, because of the labor supply responses
it generates, the marginal rates of the tax reform aﬀect directly the agent's utility,
even conditional on the average tax rate change. In other words, to determine the
compensating tax reform, we need to simultaneously solve for the average and the
marginal tax rate functions. This is the key diﬀerence with the partial equilibrium
environment and the main technical challenge of our paper.
The main result of our paper is Theorem 1 that gives a closed-form solution
and thus provides the complete analytical characterization of the compensating tax
reform in response to any wage disruption in general equilibrium. This formula is
valid for marginal wage disruptions; that is, our tax reform compensates the ﬁrst-
order eﬀects on welfare caused by this shock. Corollary 2 also derives a closed-form
formula for the ﬁscal surplus of the wage disruption and its compensation, i.e. the
impact on government budget of the disruption and its associated compensation,
which generalizes the traditional Kaldor-Hicks criterion and provides a simple test
to determine whether economic shocks or policies are beneﬁcial, in the sense that
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oﬀseting their associated individual welfare gains and losses using only distortionary
tax instruments is budget-feasible.
For ease of exposition, our theoretical analysis proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst
analyze a simpliﬁed version of our model in Section 1, in which we make a num-
ber of assumptions ensuring that all of the relevant elasticity variables are constant.
Speciﬁcally, we assume there that the utility function is quasilinear with isoelastic
disutility of labor, that there are no labor force participation decisions, that the pro-
duction function has a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) over labor inputs,
and that the tax schedule in the initial (undisrupted) economy has a constant rate of
progressivity. These functional-form assumptions allow us to derive in the simplest
possible way the welfare compensating tax reform and analyze its economic implica-
tions. Second, in Section 2, we relax all of these assumptions: we allow for general
individual-speciﬁc preferences with income eﬀects, intensive (hours) and extensive
(participation) labor supply decisions, a general production function over the labor
inputs of all skills and capital, and an arbitrarily non-linear initial tax schedule. We
derive a closed-form solution to the compensation problem in this environment that
directly generalizes that obtained in the simpler framework.
Our theoretical analysis shows that there are three key elements, all given in
closed-form, in the formula for the welfare compensating tax reform that depart from
the simple partial equilibrium policy. First, the modiﬁed wage disruption variable
properly deﬁnes the relevant disruption that needs to be compensated  namely, one
that accounts for all of the labor demand spillovers induced by the initial shock.
Second, the progressivity variable accounts for the fact that a reform of the
marginal tax rate of an agent distorts his labor supply, which in general equilib-
rium aﬀects his wage because the marginal product of labor is decreasing. Therefore,
the compensation needs to be designed in such a way that the welfare eﬀects caused
indirectly by the marginal tax rates of the reform counteract those induced by the
average tax rates. This naturally leads to a diﬀerential equation for the compensa-
tion, and hence exponentially decreasing or increasing income tax rates. This implies,
in response to a positive (resp., negative) disruption of a given wage, a progressive
(resp., regressive) tax reform on incomes below that of the disrupted agent. The rate
of progressivity is determined by the ratio of the labor supply and labor demand
elasticities, net of the rate of progressivity of the initial tax code.
Third, the compensation-of-compensation variable accounts for the fact that a
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lower marginal tax rate at a given income, by distorting labor supply, also aﬀects the
entire wage distribution because of the cross-wage eﬀects originating from the skill
complementarities in production. The welfare impact of this indirect wage adjust-
ments needs to be itself compensated using the tax schedule. However, the marginal
tax rates of this second round of compensation generate in turn further wage and
welfare changes for all of the agents, and so on. This leads to an a priori complex
sequence of compensations  formally represented by an integro-diﬀerential equation.
We show that we can generally solve this ﬁxed point problem in closed-form by deﬁn-
ing inductively a sequence of functions that each capture a given round of iterated
compensation. Remarkably, if the production function is CES, we show that each
round of iterated compensation is a constant fraction of the previous one. In this
case, compensating the welfare gains and losses resulting from the skill complemen-
tarities in production simply requires a uniform shift of the marginal tax rates in
addition to the progressive reform derived in the absence of cross-wage eﬀects.
We ﬁnally propose in Section 3 a concrete application of our theory in the context
of the robotization of the U.S. and the German economies between 1990 and 2007.
We use Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017]'s data for the U.S., and Dauth et al (2017)
data for Germany, which give the estimated impact of an additional robot per one
thousand workers on the wages of diﬀerent skills  roughly the amount of automation
observed in the U.S. between these dates. The closed-form solution that we derive
allows to immediately determine quantitatively the compensating reform. We ﬁnd
that in the U.S., an additional robot per thousand workers requires a progressive
tax reform, where the tax payment of agents at the 10th (resp., 90th) percentile of
the wage distribution decreases (resp., increases) by 110% of their income loss (resp.,
125% of their income gain) from the disruption. This represents a 2 percentage point
decrease (resp., a 0.5 pp increase) in their average tax rate, and generates a positive
$16 budget surplus for the government. In Germany, workers at the 10th percentile
should have their tax bill reduced by 310% of their income loss, while those at the
90th percentile should have theirs reduced by 150% of their income loss.
Related literature. We now brieﬂy describe the relationship to the literature.
There are two main (and closely related) approaches in the theory of taxation. The
ﬁrst, represented by Saez and Stantcheva [2016], consists of assuming a particular
social welfare function, or more generally of choosing the generalized social welfare
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weights that society assigns to diﬀerent agents, and deriving optimal taxes given this
criterion. The second approach, analyzed by Kaplow [2012, 2004] and Hendren [2014],
consists of generalizing the Kaldor-Hicks principle in the partial equilibrium setting.
Our results in Section 1.4, which consist of constructing the compensating tax reform
in partial equilibrium, build on their work. Our main contribution (in particular,
Proposition 2 and Theorem 1) is the analysis of the general equilibrium environment,
where a disruption to the wage of an agent and a tax reform also directly impact the
welfare of other individuals. We discuss the advantages of the compensation approach
for the ﬁeld of taxation in Section A.6.
Second, and most closely related to our general equilibrium framework, Itskhoki
[2008] and Antras, de Gortari, and Itskhoki [2016] study compensating tax reforms
and the welfare implications of trade liberalization in a general-equilibrium setting
within a class of distortionary taxes. Itskhoki [2008] solves for optimal redistribu-
tion in a closed and open economy following trade liberalization within a class of
distortionary taxes. Antras, de Gortari, and Itskhoki [2016] solve for the welfare
and inequality correction following trade liberalization, restricting taxes (as well as
tax reforms) to be of the CRP form (Bénabou [2002], Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante [2016], Heathcote, Storesletten, Violante, et al. [2017]) and the production
function to be CES. While we do not consider a sophisticated model of trade, we solve
the compensation problem allowing for both general nonlinear tax schedules and tax
reforms, and a general production function. More broadly, our model is within the
class of Mirrleesean economies in general equilibrium. Stiglitz [1982a], Rothschild and
Scheuer [2013, 2014, 2016], Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet [2015a,b], Scheuer and Werning
[2016], Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] study optimal taxes in this environment.
These papers do not address the compensation problem, which is our main contribu-
tion and leads to diﬀerent economic insights, as well as a simpler implementation in
practice (since it is known in closed-form).
Third, our application to automation relies on the results of Acemoglu and Re-
strepo [2017] (for the U.S.) and Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum, and Woessner [2017]
(for Germany), who estimate the impact of robots on the wage distribution.
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1 A Simple Model
We start by presenting a very simple version of our general framework, which allows
us to derive most transparently our main result  namely, a closed-form formula for
the tax reform that oﬀsets the welfare gains and losses of an arbitrary disruption of
the wage distribution in general equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we make in this section
the following assumptions: (i) the utility function is quasilinear with an isoelastic
disutility of labor eﬀort, and is the same for all agents; (ii) labor supply is chosen on
the intensive margin only, i.e., there are no participation decisions; (iii) the production
function has a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) over the labor inputs of all skill
types, and there is no capital input; (iv) the labor income tax schedule in the initial
(undisrupted) economy has a constant rate of progressivity (CRP). (Note, however,
that we allow tax reforms to be arbitrary nonlinear functions of labor income.) The
goal of these assumptions is to ensure that the relevant behavioral and price elasticities
are constant.1 We relax them and solve the fully general model in Section 2.
1.1 Initial equilibrium
There is a continuum of measure one of individuals indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In this
section, we assume for simplicity that all agents have quasilinear preferences over
consumption c and labor supply l with isoelastic disutility of eﬀort: u (c, l) = c− l1+
1
e
1+ 1
e
.
Agent i earns a wage wi ∈ R+ which he takes as given. He chooses his labor supply
li and earns pre-tax labor income yi = wili. He pays a tax T (yi) on labor income,
where the non-linear tax schedule T : R+ → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Agent i maximizes his utility subject to the budget constraint c = wil−T (wil). The
agent's indirect utility is given by
Ui = wili − T (wili)− l
1+ 1
e
i
1 + 1
e
, (1)
1Speciﬁcally, Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that the agents' elasticities of labor supply with
respect to the marginal tax rate are constant, and that the income eﬀects and the elasticities of
participation are equal to zero. Assumption (iii) implies that the elasticities of labor demand with
respect to the wage are constant, as well as the cross-wage elasticities with respect to the labor
supply of a given skill, that is, an agent's labor supply has the same percentage impact on the wage
of all other workers. Assumption (iv) ensures that the labor supply elasticities with respect to the
wage, as well as the indirect adjustments of labor supply due to the agents' endogenous movements
along the nonlinear tax schedule, are constant.
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where his labor supply li is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
li = [(1− T ′ (wili)) wi]e . (2)
We denote by w ≡ {wi}i∈[0,1], l ≡ {li}i∈[0,1], U ≡ {Ui}i∈[0,1] and L ≡ {Li}i∈[0,1] the
distributions of individual wages, labor supplies, indirect utilities and aggregate labor
supplies in the initial economy with tax schedule T . Without loss of generality, we
can order agents so that wages wi are increasing in the index i, given the initial tax
schedule T . Hence the agent's skill type i can be interpreted as his percentile in the
wage distribution in the initial (undisrupted) economy.2
There is a continuum of mass one of identical ﬁrms that produce output using
the aggregate labor supply3 Li of each type i ∈ [0, 1]. In this section, we assume for
simplicity that the aggregate production function has a CES functional form (as in,
e.g., Heathcote et al. [2016]):
F ({Li}i∈[0,1]) =
[ˆ 1
0
θiL
1− 1
εD
i di
] εD
εD−1
, (3)
where θi > 0 for all i. The parameter ε
D > 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution
between any two labor inputs. If εD →∞, the environment converges to the partial
equilibrium model where wages are exogenous and given by wi = θi for all i.
4 In
equilibrium, ﬁrms earn no proﬁts, and the wage wi is equal to the marginal product
of type-i labor:
wi = F
′
i (L) = θi
(
Y¯
Li
)1/εD
, (4)
where F ′i ≡ ∂F/∂Li denotes the partial derivative of F with respect to its ith
2Using (2) and (5), it is then easy to show that incomes yi = wili are then strictly increasing in
skills i, so that there are one-to-one maps between skills, wages and incomes in the initial equilibrium.
Importantly, we do not require that the tax reforms we consider keep this monotonicity property.
We assume that incomes y belong to a compact interval [y, y¯] ⊂ R+ and have a continuous density
fY (·).
3Since the distribution of agents on [0, 1] is uniform, we have Li = li in equilibrium. Note,
however, that each individual agent is atomistic within his skill group, so that his wage changes only
if all individuals with the same skill adjust their labor supply (e.g., in response to a tax change). In
particular, each agent takes his wage as given and independent of his own choices.
4If εD = 1 (resp., εD → 0), the production function is Cobb-Douglas (resp., Leontieﬀ). Labor
inputs are gross substitutes (resp., gross complements) if εD > 1 (resp., εD < 1).
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variable Li and Y¯ ≡ F (L) is the average income in the economy.
The government levies taxes on labor income. In this section, we assume for
simplicity that in the initial equilibrium, i.e. before the disruption occurs, the tax
schedule has a CRP functional form:5
T (y) = y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p, (5)
with p ∈ (−∞, 1) and τ ∈ R. The parameter p is the constant rate of progressivity
of the tax schedule, deﬁned as (minus) the elasticity of the retention rate (1− T ′ (y))
with respect to gross income y. In particular, if p = 0 (resp., p > 0, p < 0) the
initial tax schedule is linear (resp., progressive, regressive). Importantly, we allow the
government to implement arbitrarily nonlinear reforms (i.e., not necessarily in the
CRP class) in response to a given wage disruption.
1.2 Wage disruptions and the welfare compensation problem
In this section we start by deﬁning a disruption of the economy's initial equilibrium,
and then formally set up the welfare compensation problem. A disruption can be
caused by various exogenous shocks: e.g., a perturbation of the production function
F (due to, say, technological change) or of the distribution of aggregate labor supplies
L = {Lj}j∈[0,1] (due to, say, immigration ﬂows).6 Suppose that this shock aﬀects the
wage distribution w by µwˆE = {µwˆEi }i∈[0,1] for some µ > 0, so that the wage of
agent i ∈ [0, 1] changes from wi to wi + µwˆEi . The disruptions we consider are
continuous maps i 7→ µwˆEi on [0, 1], and without loss of generality we normalize
‖wˆE‖ ≡ max
i∈[0,1]
|wˆEi | = 1. The function wˆE thus deﬁnes the direction of the wage
disruption, while the scalar µ represents its size.
Deﬁnition 1. (Wage disruption.) Consider an exogenous shock (FˆE, Lˆ
E
) to the
economy's production function F and the initial equilibrium distribution of aggregate
labor supplies L. We deﬁne the wage disruption µwˆE, with ‖wˆE‖ = 1 and µ > 0,
by the change in the wage distribution w caused by these shocks, keeping individual
labor supplies ﬁxed: for all i ∈ [0, 1], µwˆEi = F˜ ′i ({Lj + LˆEj }j∈[0,1]) −F ′i ({Lj}j∈[0,1]),
where F˜ ≡ F + FˆE.
5See, e.g., Bénabou [2002], Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante [2016].
6In Section 2, where capital is an input in production, a disruption can also be caused by an
exogenous change in the aggregate capital stock.
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The government can implement an arbitrarily nonlinear tax reform µTˆ (·) of the
tax schedule,7 so that the statutory tax payment at income level y changes from T (y)
to T (y) + µTˆ (y).
In response to a wage disruption µwˆE and a tax reform µTˆ , individuals optimally
adjust their labor supply. In general equilibrium, this further impacts their wage,
which in turn alters their labor supply decisions, and so on. We denote by µwˆi and
µlˆi the total endogenous changes in individual i's wage and labor supply following the
perturbation (µwˆE, µTˆ ). That is, the wage and labor supply of an agent with skill i in
the equilibrium of the disrupted economy are respectively equal to w˜i = wi+µwˆ
E
i +µwˆi
and l˜i = li + µlˆi. We denote by U˜i = Ui + µUˆi the resulting indirect utility of agent
i in the new equilibrium. Formally, the agent's welfare in the disrupted economy is
given by
U˜i = w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i)− l˜
1+ 1
e
i
1 + 1
e
, (6)
where (w˜i, l˜i) are deﬁned by the perturbed ﬁrst-order condition
l˜i = [(1− T ′(w˜il˜i)− µTˆ ′(w˜il˜i)) w˜i]e, (7)
and the perturbed wage equation
w˜i = F˜
′
i ({L˜j}j∈[0,1]). (8)
with L˜j ≡ Lj + LˆEj + µlˆj.
A wage disruption µwˆE generally creates winners and losers, i.e., welfare gains
for some individuals and welfare losses for others. The welfare compensation problem
consists of designing a reform Tˆ of the existing tax code that oﬀsets these losses by
redistributing the income gains of the winners. Such a tax reform must be designed
7In Section 1.5 we assume that the tax reforms Tˆ that the government can implement are
continuously diﬀerentiable, bounded, with bounded ﬁrst derivative. This deﬁnes a Banach space on
which the norm of a function Tˆ is given by ‖Tˆ‖ = sup
y∈R+
|Tˆ (y) |+ sup
y∈R+
|Tˆ ′ (y) |. Note that we do not
impose ‖Tˆ‖ = 1, so that the normalization of the tax reform by the same scalar µ > 0 as the wage
disruption is without loss of generality. The same holds for the endogenous wage and labor supply
adjustments µwˆi, µlˆi below.
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such that each agent's compensating variation8 U˜i − Ui is equal to zero, taking into
account the endogenous wage and labor supply responses that it induces.
Deﬁnition 2. (Welfare compensation problem.) A welfare compensating policy
in response to a wage disruption µwˆE is a tax reform µTˆ such that: (i) the utility
U˜i of each agent i after the disruption, deﬁned in ( 6), and the tax reform satisﬁes
U˜i = Ui; (ii) labor supply is chosen optimally, i.e. ( 7) holds; and (iii) the wage is
equal to the marginal product of labor, i.e. ( 8) holds. Equation ( 41) in the Appendix
deﬁnes the ﬁscal surplus, i.e., the change in government revenue induced by the wage
disruption µwˆE and the compensating tax reform µTˆ .
In what follows, we characterize analytically the solution to the welfare compen-
sation problem for marginal wage disruptions, i.e., as µ → 0. Thus, our exercise
consists of designing a tax reform Tˆ that compensates the ﬁrst-order welfare eﬀects
of a small wage disruption in the direction wˆE.
1.3 Elasticity concepts
We ﬁrst deﬁne the elasticities εS,ri and ε
S,w
i of labor supply li with respect to the
retention rate ri ≡ 1 − T ′ (wili) and the wage wi respectively, along the nonlinear
budget constraint, as9
εS,ri ≡
∂ ln li
∂ ln ri
=
e
1 + pe
, and εS,wi ≡
∂ ln li
∂ lnwi
=
(1− p) e
1 + pe
. (9)
The (constant) labor supply elasticity εS,r diﬀers from the structural parameter e as it
takes into account that the initial labor supply response to a change in the retention
rate impacts the marginal tax rate T ′ (wili) faced by the agent, if the initial tax
schedule is nonlinear, by an amount equal to the rate of progressivity p of the nonlinear
tax schedule; this in turn causes a further endogenous labor supply adjustment given
by the elasticity e, leading to the correction term p × e in the denominator of εS,r.
Moreover, the elasticity with respect to the wage, εS,w, diﬀers from that with respect
8See, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [1995], p. 82. Since the utility function is quasilinear,
it is the monetary amount that an agent i would be willing to pay, after the wage disruption µwˆE
and the tax reform µTˆ , in order to be as well oﬀ as in the initial equilibrium. A positive (resp.,
negative) value implies that an individual i beneﬁts (resp., loses) from these shocks.
9The assumptions we made in Section 1.1 ensure that the these elasticities are constant. This
allows us to drop the subscripts i for the remainder of Section 1.
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to the retention rate, εS,r, because a change in the wage aﬀects (1− T ′ (wili))wi, and
hence labor supply, both directly as in the case of an exogenous perturbation in the
retention rate, and indirectly through its eﬀect on the marginal tax rate T ′ (wili).
The latter is accounted for by the correction (1− p) in the numerator of εS,w.
Second, we deﬁne the elasticities of wages {wi}i∈[0,1] with respect to the aggregate
labor supply Lj. The labor supply of type j aﬀects the wage of any other skill i 6= j
because diﬀerent skills are imperfect substitutes in production, and the wage of skill
j because the marginal product of labor is decreasing. We deﬁne the corresponding
structural cross-wage and own-wage elasticities γi,j and 1/ε
D
j , respectively, by
γi,j ≡ ∂ lnwi
∂ lnLj
=
1
εD
yj
Y¯
, and
1
εDj
≡ −[∂ lnwj
∂ lnLj
− lim
i→j
∂ lnwi
∂ lnLj
] =
1
εD
(10)
where both equalities are proved in the Appendix. The ﬁrst expression shows that
when the production function is CES, the cross-wage elasticity γi,j ≡ ∂ lnwi∂ lnLj does not
depend on i, implying that a change in the labor supply of type j has the same
percentage impact on the wage of every type i 6= j; for the remainder of this section
we thus simply denote γi,j by γj. The second expression constructs the own-wage
elasticity 1/εDj , or equivalently the inverse of the partial-equilibrium elasticity of labor
demand, by subtracting from
∂ lnwj
∂ lnLj
the complementarity lim
i→j
∂ lnwi
∂ lnLj
between skill j and
its neighboring skills i ≈ j, thus capturing the impact of the labor eﬀort Lj on the
wage wj arising purely from the fact that the marginal productivity of skill j is a
decreasing function of the aggregate labor of its own type. With a CES production
function with parameter εD, this elasticity is constant and equal to 1/εD.
1.4 Compensation in Partial Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the solution to the compensation problem takes a simple
form in partial equilibrium, even when when taxes are distortionary. Suppose that
there is inﬁnite substitutability between skills in production, i.e., εD → ∞. The
production function thus reads F (L) =
´ 1
0
θiLidi, so that wages are exogenous and
equal to wi = θi for all i in the initial equilibrium.
10,11 In this case, the wage disruption
µwˆE generates no further endogenous adjustment in the wage: wˆi = 0 for all i ∈ [0, 1],
10This is the standard partial-equilibrium assumption made by Mirrlees [1971].
11As will be clear in Section 2.4, none of the results of this section (except formula (12)) rely on
the speciﬁc functional forms assumed for the utility function and the tax schedule.
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so that w˜i is simply equal to wi + µwˆ
E
i . We characterize analytically the solution to
the welfare compensation problem, i.e., the compensating tax reform µTˆ and its
ﬁscal surplus µR(wˆE), for marginal wage disruptions. The proofs are gathered in the
Appendix.
A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of equation (6) around the initial equilibrium (i.e.,
as µ→ 0) implies that the change Uˆi in the indirect utility of agent i induced by the
wage disruption and the tax reform is given by:
0 = Uˆi = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi wˆ
E
i
wi
− Tˆ (yi) , (11)
where the ﬁrst equality imposes that agent i keeps the same level of welfare in the
disrupted economy as in the initial equilibrium (i.e., U˜i = Ui), once the new tax
schedule is implemented. This equation shows that, in the partial equilibrium model,
the change in the indirect utility of agent i is due to: (i) the exogenous change (say,
increase) wˆEi in his wage, weighted by the share (1− T ′ (yi)) that he keeps after
paying taxes on the implied income gain liwˆ
E
i =
yi
wi
wˆEi (the ﬁrst term of (11)); (ii) the
change in his tax liability Tˆ (yi) (the second term of (11)), which makes him poorer
(resp. richer) if Tˆ (yi) > 0 (resp. < 0).
Crucially, note that the change in the marginal tax rate, Tˆ ′ (yi), does not enter
equation (11), and therefore does not matter for welfare (conditional on the average
tax rate Tˆ (yi)). This follows from the envelope theorem: the marginal tax rate that
individuals face aﬀect agents' indirect utility only through their labor supply decision
(equation (2)); but since they choose labor supply optimally before the perturbation,
their behavioral response to the marginal tax rate change induces no ﬁrst-order eﬀect
on welfare.12
Next, a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of equation (6), which imposes that the labor
supply of agent i remains optimal in the disrupted economy, can be written in terms
of the elasticity notations introduced in Section 1.1 as:
lˆpei
li
= εS,w
wˆEi
wi
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) . (12)
This equation shows that the agent's labor supply adjusts because of the change in
his wage wˆEi , by an amount given by the labor supply elasticity with respect to the
12See details and discussion in the Appendix (equation (40)).
12
wage εS,w, and the change in his marginal tax rate Tˆ ′ (yi), by an amount given by the
elasticity with respect to the retention rate εS,r.
We now summarize the results obtained so far. Equation (11) immediately gives
the tax reform µTˆ which ensures that, after reoptimizing their behavior, individuals
remain as well oﬀ as before the wage disruption µwˆE. Equation (12) gives the cor-
responding change in the labor supply of agents following this wage disruption and
compensating tax reform, and the impact on government budget is then straightfor-
ward to derive. We thus obtained the solution to the welfare compensation problem
in closed form.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is inﬁnite substitutability between skills in pro-
duction, i.e., εD → ∞. Consider a marginal disruption of the wage distribution w
in the direction wˆE = {wˆEi }i∈[0,1]. There exists a unique tax reform Tˆ that solves the
welfare compensation problem, namely: for all i ∈ [0, 1],
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi wˆ
E
i
wi
. (13)
The ﬁscal surplus R(wˆE) is given by expression (42) in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 is our ﬁrst step in generalizing the standard Kaldor-Hicks criterion
to the environment where type-speciﬁc lump-sum taxes are unavailable. It shows
that if wages are exogenous, the compensating tax reform consists of increasing or
decreasing the average tax rates Tˆ (yi)
yi
by an amount equal to the net-of-tax income
gain or loss of agents resulting from the economy's disruption, (1− T ′ (yi)) wˆ
E
i
wi
.
1.5 Compensation in General Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the welfare compensation problem in the general equi-
librium environment, that is, for any εD > 0. We show in the Appendix that the
mathematical structure of this problem is a system of integro-diﬀerential algebraic
equations (IDAE). We derive its solution in a closed-form for marginal wage disrup-
tions, i.e., to a ﬁrst-order as the size of the shock µ→ 0. The proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.
As discussed in Section 1.2, in general equilibrium, the initial wage disruption µwˆE
generates further endogenous adjustments µwˆi in the wage, which directly aﬀect every
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agent's indirect utility and choice of labor supply. A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of
equation (8) implies that the endogenous wage changes wˆi are given by
wˆi
wi
= − 1
εD
lˆi
li
+
ˆ 1
0
γj
lˆj
lj
dj, (14)
where 1/εD and γj are respectively the own-wage and cross-wage elasticities, deﬁned
in (10). This equation has the following economic interpretation: a one percent
increase in the labor supply of an individual with skill i leads to a −1/εD percent
change in the wage of type i, because the marginal product of labor is decreasing;
analogously, a one percent increase in the labor supply of an individual of type j,
for any j ∈ [0, 1], leads to a γj percent change in the wage of type i, through the
complementarities between skills in production.
Now, following the same steps as in Section 1.4, a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of
equation (6) around the initial equilibrium implies that the change Uˆi in the indirect
utility of agent i induced by the wage disruption and the tax reform is given by:
0 = Uˆi = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
[
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
]
− Tˆ (yi) , (15)
where the ﬁrst equality imposes that agent i keeps the same level of welfare in the
disrupted economy as in the initial equilibrium. This expression generalizes equation
(11) (replacing wˆEi with wˆ
E
i + wˆi) and implies that, in addition to the two partial-
equilibrium forces described in Section 1.4, there is now the third channel through
which the compensating variation of the agent changes, namely: (iii) the endogenous
changes lˆi and {lˆj}j∈[0,1] in the labor supplies of type-i and type-j agents, by impacting
the wage of skill i by wˆi (through equation (14)), have a ﬁrst-order impact on the
indirect utility of agent i.
Crucially, despite the envelope theorem, the endogenous changes in labor supply
now matter for welfare, through their impact on wages resulting from the decreasing
marginal productivities and the complementarities in production. As we demonstrate
below, it follows that in general equilibrium and when only distortionary tax instru-
ments are available the marginal tax rates of the reform now aﬀect directly the agent's
utility through the labor supply responses they induce. This is the key diﬀerence with
the partial equilibrium environment.
Next, a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of equation (6), which imposes that the labor
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supply of agent i remains optimal in the disrupted economy, can be written in terms
of the elasticity notations introduced in Section 1.1 as:
lˆi
li
= εS,w
[
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
]
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) . (16)
This expression generalizes equation (12) obtained in partial equilibrium (replacing
wˆEi with wˆ
E
i + wˆi). The presence of the endogenous wage change wˆi in the right hand
side, along with equation (14), implies that, in addition to the direct eﬀects caused by
the exogenous wage and tax changes wˆEi and Tˆ
′ (yi), the adjustment in labor supply
of agent i, lˆi, is now also aﬀected by those of all other agents j, {lˆj}j∈[0,1]. Hence the
labor supply changes of all of the agents now have to be solved for simultaneously as
functions of the wage disruption function wˆE and the tax reform Tˆ . The following
lemma, which follows from Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016], derives the closed-
form solution for lˆi, for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1. The solution to (16) is given by: for all i,
lˆi
li
=
δlˆpei
li
+ δεS,w
ˆ 1
0
Γj
δlˆpej
lj
dj, (17)
where lˆpei is deﬁned in (12), δ ≡ 1/[1 + ε
S,w
εD
], and Γj ≡ γj/δ.
Equation (17) shows that the percentage change in the labor supply of type i, lˆi/li,
is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst, lˆpei /li, is the partial-equilibrium expression (12),
weighted by δ. This weight accounts for the fact that the marginal product of labor
is decreasing, so that the agent's initial labor supply adjustment (say, increase) lˆpei
lowers his wage by a factor 1/εD, which in turn leads him to reduce his labor supply
by a factor εS,w/εD, therefore dampening his initial response by δ ≡ 1/[1 + εS,w
εD
]. The
second term in (17) accounts for the fact that the wage disruption and the tax reform
also lead to percentage increases δ lˆpej /lj in the labor supplies of agents of type j 6= i.
These responses impact the wage of agent i by Γj (δ lˆ
pe
j /lj), where Γi = γj/δ can be
thought of the total elasticity of the wage of skill i with respect to the labor supply
of type j. This total cross-wage elasticity accounts for the direct eﬀect γj, as well as
all of the indirect eﬀects occuring in general equilibrium  the wage change induces
further labor supply responses, which in turn aﬀect wages, etc. When the production
function is CES these spillover eﬀects are simply captured by the ampliﬁcation factor
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1/δ.13 Now, this total change in wi implies a change in li given by the elasticity ε
S,w,
again weighted by the factor δ to take into account the decreasing marginal product
of labor. Summing over all types j ∈ [0, 1] leads to equation (17).
Taking stock. We gather and discuss the results obtained so far. In contrast to
equation (11) in partial equilibrium, (15) does not yield directly the solution for the
compensating tax change Tˆ (yi) as a function of the exogenous disruption wˆ
E
i . This
is because the agent's indirect utility is also aﬀected by the endogenous adjustment
in his wage, wˆi, which is determined by the labor supply responses of all agents,
{lˆj}j∈[0,1], via equation (14). In turn, the labor supply change of any agent j, lˆj,
depends on the changes in the marginal tax rates {Tˆ ′ (yk)}k∈[0,1] faced by everyone
in the economy, via equation (17). Thus, in general equilibrium, both the average
and the marginal tax rates of the reform have ﬁrst-order welfare repercussions  this
implies that the consequences of a given tax reform are much richer, and hence the
design of the compensating policy much more complex, than in partial equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, a higher average tax rate at a given income y∗, Tˆ (y∗) > 0, implies
a reduction in the welfare of agent y∗, by directly making him poorer, as in partial
equilibrium (last term in equation (15)). Moreover, in general equilibrium, a higher
marginal tax rate at income y∗, Tˆ ′ (y∗) > 0, implies: (a) a higher average tax rate for
all incomes y > y∗, which reduces the welfare of these agents; (b) an increase in the
welfare of agent y∗, who works less (substitution eﬀect, ﬁrst term in equation (17))
and hence earns a higher wage (decreasing marginal product, ﬁrst term in equation
(14)); (c) a decrease in the welfare of all agents y 6= y∗, whose wage decreases due
to the lower labor supply of agent y∗ (production complementarities, second term in
equation (14)).
Suppose that the planner implements the tax reform (13) that would compensate
every agent's welfare in partial equilibrium. Through standard substitution eﬀects,
this tax reform aﬀects individual labor supplies and hence, through decreasing returns
and complementarities in production, the wage distribution. These lead to additional
ﬁrst-order welfare eﬀects that need to be themselves compensated, by further re-
forming the tax-and-transfer system. Therefore, the combination of distortionary tax
instruments and elastic labor supply (whereby marginal tax rates aﬀect labor supply
13This is because each round of indirect general-equilibrium eﬀect on the wage is a constant
fraction of the direct eﬀect. See Lemma 2 for the general expression of the elasticities Γi,j .
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behavior) and general equilibrium (whereby labor supply decisions determine wages)
leads to a ﬁxed point problem for the compensating tax reform. Formally, the tax
reform Tˆ is the solution to an integro-diﬀerential equation that we derive in Lemma
3 in the Appendix.
Main result. The next proposition gives a complete analytical characterization of
the compensating tax reform in response to any wage disruption in general equilib-
rium. Note that since there is a one-to-one map between types i and incomes yi, we
can change variables and index by income the wages wyi ≡ wi, labor supplies lyi ≡ li,
wage disruptions wˆEyi ≡ wˆEi , and elasticities γyj ≡ γj/y′ (j), Γyj ≡ Γj/y′ (j).
Proposition 2. Suppose that that the utility function is quasilinear with isoelastic
disutility of labor, the production function is CES, and the initial tax schedule is CRP.
Consider a marginal disruption of the wage distribution w in the direction wˆE =
{wˆEi }i∈[0,1]. The following tax reform Tˆ solves the welfare compensation problem: for
all i,
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yj [Ωˆ
E
yj
+ λ] dyj, (18)
where the modiﬁed wage disruption variable Ωˆ
E
is deﬁned for all j ∈ [0, 1] by
ΩˆEyj ≡
δwˆEyj
wyj
+ δεS,w
ˆ y¯
y
Γyk
δwˆEyk
wyk
dyk, (19)
the progressivity variable E is deﬁned by
E yi,yj ≡
εD
δ εS,r
1
yj
(
yi
yj
)εD/εS,r
, (20)
and the compensation-of-compensation variable λ is a constant equal to14 E[yj
Y¯
(ΩˆEyj −´ y¯
yj
E yj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk)].
We discuss and interpret formula (18) in Section 1.6. Note that this is a closed-
form expression, as it depends only on the exogenous wage disruption wˆE and on
variables that are all observed (or known in closed-form as a function of observables) in
14This expression for λ assumes y¯ →∞. The expression for ﬁnite y¯ is given in the Appendix.
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the pre-disruption economy: statutory marginal tax rates, elasticities of labor supply
and labor demand, cross-wage elasticity between skills. Therefore it is straightforward
to implement such a tax reform in practice.15 In Appendix B.1 we provide a graphical
representation and detailed discussion of this formula.
1.6 Analysis of the compensating tax reform
The compensating tax reform (18) features three important departures from the par-
tial equilibrium compensation (13).
1. Modiﬁed disruption: Accounting for the incidence of the disruption
The modiﬁed wage disruption ΩˆEj reﬂects the importance of correctly accounting
for the incidence of a given economic shock in general equilibrium. The proof of
Proposition 2 shows that ΩˆEj is equal to the sum of the exogenous and endogenous
wage adjustments, δ(wˆEj + wˆj)/wj. Intuitively, (19) shows that for any k the initial
shock
wˆEk
wk
to the wage of any type k translates into a labor supply response of type
k given by δεS,w
wˆEk
wk
, which in turn impacts the wage wj of type j by the elasticity
Γk. Therefore, the relevant disruption that the tax reform must compensate is Ωˆ
E
j
rather than simply wˆEj /wj. Importantly, it is possible that empirical studies that
evaluate the impact of a disruption on the wage distribution, capture not only the
direct eﬀect of the disruption, {wˆEj }j∈[0,1], but also all of the indirect eﬀects due to the
labor demand spillovers in general equilibrium; this is the case, for instance, in our
empirical application in Section 3. In this case, formula (18) can be applied directly
using {ΩˆEj }j∈[0,1] as a primitive.16
2. Progressivity: Accounting for the decreasing marginal product of labor
To interpret the progressivity variable (19), we consider a slightly simpler produc-
tion function than (3), with decreasing marginal product of labor but inﬁnite substi-
tutability between skills: F (L) =
´ 1
0
θiL
1− 1
εD
i di.
17 We can easily show that in this
15See Section 3 for an application.
16Conversely, it is also straightforward to derive the exogenous disruption {wˆEj }j∈[0,1] from the
modiﬁed disruption {ΩˆEj }j∈[0,1].
17This reﬂects, for example, the downward-sloping demand curve for labor when there is a ﬁxed
factor of production, such as land or capital, for each type. We assume for simplicity that the
government taxes ﬁrms' proﬁts at 100%.
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case, λ = 0 in formula (18), so that
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi))
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yj Ωˆ
E
yj
dyj, (21)
with ΩˆEyj = δwˆ
E
yj
/wyj . To understand this expression, recall ﬁrst that in partial equi-
librium (i.e., as εD →∞), the tax reform that compensates a disruption {wˆEi }i∈[0,1] is
given by Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi)) wˆ
E
yi
wyi
. That is, as we discussed in Section 1.4, the change
in the average tax rate must exactly compensate the exogenous wage disruption,
weighted by the retention rate of the initial tax schedule. Now, when the marginal
product of labor is decreasing, instead, it is easy to show that equations (15) and (16)
imply
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi))
δwˆEyi
wyi
+
δεS,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi) . (22)
That is, the change in the average tax rate must now compensate both the (modiﬁed)
wage disruption and, in addition, the wage correction generated endogenously by the
marginal tax rate of the reform  recall that a change in the marginal tax rate by
Tˆ ′ (yi) impacts the labor supply of agents i by δεS,rTˆ ′ (yi), and hence their wage by
δεS,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi). Solving this diﬀerential equation leads to the solution (21).
Now, consider in particular a disruption that raises the wage of skill i∗ only,
i.e. wˆEi∗ > 0 and wˆ
E
i = 0 for all i 6= i∗.18 The partial-equilibrium compensation
Tˆ (yi) is then equal to zero for all incomes yi 6= yi∗that are not directly disrupted
(i.e. wˆEi = 0). In general equilibrium, instead, equation (22) shows that, for agents
with income yi < yi∗ who are not initially disrupted, the compensating tax reform
must satisfy Tˆ (yi)
yi
= δε
S,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi). In order to raise the tax payment of agent i∗ so as
to redistribute his income gain, the government must raise the marginal tax rates
on (at least some) incomes yi < yi∗ , so that Tˆ
′ (yi) > 0.19 But this generates a
welfare gain for agent i  formally, an increase in the marginal tax rate of agent i
by Tˆ ′ (yi) lowers his labor supply by δεS,r Tˆ ′ (yi) (by construction of the labor supply
elasticity), so that his wage increases by 1
εD
δεS,r Tˆ ′ (yi) (by construction of the labor
demand elasticity). This beneﬁt needs to be compensated counteracted by a welfare
18Formally, the disruption
wˆEi
wi
is a Dirac delta function at skill i∗.
19For incomes y > yi∗ , we have Tˆ (y) = Tˆ
′ (y) = 0.
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loss of equal magnitude via an increase in the average tax rate Tˆ (yi)
yi
> 0. Thus, the
key insight is that in general equilibrium, the government impacts individual welfare
through both the average and the marginal tax rates: an increase in the former (resp.,
the latter) lowers (resp., raises) the agent's utility. Therefore, a welfare compensating
tax reform must be such that these two forces exactly cancel out, so that an agent
that incurs a marginal tax rate increase must also incur an average tax rate increase.
Crucially, notice that the key parameter is the ratio between the elasticity of labor
supply and the elasticity of labor demand, which determines the extent to which an
increase in the marginal tax rate raises the agent's welfare  by lowering his labor
supply (εS,r) and raising his wage (1/εD).
The shape of the compensating tax reform Tˆ depends in particular on whether
εD
δεS,r
≥ 1, or equivalently εD
εS,r
≥ p, where p is the local rate of progressivity of the
initial tax schedule.20 Suppose ﬁrst that ε
D
δεS,r
= 1, i.e., ε
D
εS,r
= p. The relationship
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= δε
S,r
εD
Tˆ ′ (yi) then requires that the average and the marginal tax rates of the
reform must coincide, so that the compensating tax schedule Tˆ must be linear for
incomes yi ≤ yi∗ . More generally, the ratio between the marginal and the average
tax rates must be equal to the constant ε
D
δεS,r
= 1 − p + εD
εS,r
, so that the tax reform
that redistributes the wage gain of skill i∗ is given by Tˆ (yi)
yi
∝ yεD/εS,r−pi I{yi≤yi∗}.21
Therefore the tax reform is progressive (resp., linear, regressive) on [y, yi∗), i.e. the
change in the average tax rate Tˆ (yi) /yi is increasing (resp., constant, decreasing) with
income, if and only if the ratio of the elasticity of labor demand and the elasticity
of labor supply in the initial (undisrupted) economy, εD/εS,r, is larger than the rate
of progressivity p of the pre-existing tax code. Empirically, the inequality ε
D
εS,r
> p is
clearly satisﬁed since we have p ≈ 0.15, εS,r ≈ 0.3, and εD ≥ 0.5.22
20This follows from the relationship ε
D
δεS,r
= 1 − p + εD
εS,r
, obtained using the deﬁnition of δ =
1/[1+ (1−p)ε
S,r
εD
]. Intuitively, the rate of progressivity of the initial tax schedule matters for the shape
of the compensating tax reform, because if p is higher then a given increase in the marginal tax
rate raises welfare by a larger amount  indeed, the wage increase that it induces leads to a smaller
increase in labor supply, as εS,w = (1− p) εS,r. Thus the increase in the marginal tax rate that is
necessary to compensate the welfare impact of a given rise in the average tax rate is smaller.
21Formally, this formula is obtained by letting ΩˆEyj be a Dirac delta function at yi∗ in formula
(21).
22See our calibration for the U.S. in Section 3.
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3. Compensation-of-compensation: Accounting for skill complementarities
The third novel eﬀect in formula (18), the constant λ, is due to the cross-wage eﬀects
originating from the skill complementarities in production. Recall that expression
(21) compensates both the individual welfare gains and losses generated by the initial
wage disruption, and the own-wage eﬀects induced endogenously by the compensation
itself when the marginal product of labor is decreasing. Now, if the government
implements this tax reform, a lower marginal tax rate at income yj also aﬀects all the
other wages {wk}k 6=j via the cross-wage elasticities Γyj . The welfare impact of this
indirect wage adjustment needs to be itself compensated using the tax schedule. In
turn, the marginal tax rates of this second round of compensation generate further
wage and welfare changes for every agent. These again must be compensated, and so
on.
Formula (18) shows that when the production function is CES and the labor
supply elasticities are constant, this series of compensation-of-compensation takes
a strikingly simple form. Formally, the following argument explains why the uniform
adjustment λ to the disruption is necessary and suﬃcient to compensate the cross-
wage eﬀects induced indirectly by the tax reform. We show in the Appendix that
the compensating tax reform Tˆ satisﬁes the following equation, which generalizes the
formula (21) obtained in the absence of cross-wage eﬀects:
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi))
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yj
[
ΩˆEyj − δ
ˆ y¯
y
Γykδε
S,r Tˆ
′ (yk)
1− T ′ (yk)dyk
]
dyj. (23)
Indeed, the average tax change at income yi must now compensate both the (modiﬁed)
exogenous wage disruption, as described above, but also the welfare eﬀects induced
by the changes in marginal tax rates at incomes {yk}k∈[0,1]. Speciﬁcally, an increase
in the marginal tax rate at income yk by Tˆ
′ (yk) reduces the labor eﬀort of skill k
by δεS,r Tˆ
′(yk)
1−T ′(yk) , by deﬁnition of the labor supply elasticity ε
S,r. This in turn reduces
the wage of agent yj by Γyk × δεS,r Tˆ
′(yk)
1−T ′(yk) . Summing over all k ∈ [0, 1] leads to the
second term in the square brackets of expression (23).
Notice that because of the terms Tˆ ′ (yk) in the right hand side, equation (23) is
a priori a non-trivial functional equation, and hence does not immediately deliver a
closed form solution for the compensating tax reform  as opposed to the simpler
equation (21). However, since the production function is CES and the labor supply
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elasticities are constant, the cross-wage elasticity Γyk depends only on yk, that is, a
change in the labor supply of skill k aﬀects the wage of all the other skills j ∈ [0, 1]
by the same percentage amount. But this in turn implies that the marginal tax rate
changes {Tˆ ′ (yk)}k∈[0,1] induce the same welfare eﬀect λ ≡ δ
´ y¯
y
Γykδε
S,r Tˆ
′(yk)
1−T ′(yk)dyk on
every agent j ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the wage changes that must be compensated in
addition to the exogenous disruption are simply a constant. Formula (18) follows
immediately; the closed-form expression for λ given in Proposition 2 is obtained by
solving the functional equation (23) explicitly.
Assuming for simplicity that y¯ → ∞, the reform derived in (21) must be com-
plemented by the following reform: (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
´∞
yi
E yi,yjλdyj = λ (1− T ′ (yi)) yi.
This additional compensation consists of a constant change (in percentage terms) in
the retention rate of the tax schedule: Tˆ
′(y)
1−T ′(y) = λ (1− p).23 Therefore, compensating
wage gain by agents with income y∗ requires a uniform shift of the marginal tax rates
in addition to the progressive reform on incomes y < y∗ already characterized in the
absence of cross-wage eﬀects.
1.7 Fiscal Surplus and other concepts of compensation
Once we know the compensating tax reform in closed-form, it is straightforward to
obtain an expression for the ﬁscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE) deﬁned in (41), i.e., the budget
impact of the wage disruption and its compensation (Corollary 2 in the Appendix).
The welfare gains of the wage disruption wˆE are redistributable if and only if
R(wˆE) ≥ 0. This, in turn, means that it is possible to use the tax system to obtain a
Pareto improvement.24 More generally than its sign, the value of the ﬁscal surplus is
important: it provides a metric that allows to compare, in monetary units, diﬀerent
economic shocks. For example, suppose that a given disruption (say, an inﬂow of im-
migration) generates more revenue, after implementing the compensating tax reform,
than another (say, automation). It follows that the government can achieve a strictly
better Pareto improvement from the former shock. s.25 Therefore, Rˆ(wˆE) provides
23We can easily show that this is equivalent to an increase in the parameter τ of the baseline tax
schedule T (y) = y − 1−τ1−py1−p by an amount τˆ given by τˆ1−τ = λ (1− p).
24For instance, the government can redistribute lump-sum the budget surplus, which creates no
distortions since the utility is quasilinear and raises everybody's welfare.
25To see this, consider the best possible redistribution of the tax revenue in case B, say µBTˆB . By
implementing a tax reform that has the same direction TˆB but a strictly higher magnitude µA > µB
(this is possible due to the larger amount of revenue that is available) in case A, the government
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as a measure of the beneﬁt or cost of a given economic shock.
Finally, it is natural to wonder what the compensating tax reform would be if the
government's objective were to compensate every agent so that their welfare would be
at least as large (rather than exactly as large) as in the initial economy  i.e., such that
U˜i ≥ Ui for all i in equation (6). In this case, equation (15) would be an inequality
and there would be an obvious multiplicity of solutions to the compensation problem.
The ﬁrst way to address the issue is to implement the exact compensation (18), and
in a second (simultaneous) stage use the extra revenue Rˆ(wˆE), if any, to achieve
a Pareto improvement. The second way to address it is to solve the compensation
problem by replacing 0 with a given function h (·) in the left hand side of (15), with
h (yi) ≥ 0 for all i. That is, we solve the compensation problem by directly specifying
the positive welfare improvements that we want to achieve for every skill level. The
corresponding compensating tax reform can then be derived following identical steps
as in the proof of Proposition 2, and its solution would depend directly on the desired
function h.
2 The General Model
In this section we relax all of the major assumptions we made in Section 1 and derive
a closed-form generalization of formula (18) for the compensating tax reform.
2.1 Initial equilibrium
Agents diﬀer along two dimensions: their skill i ∈ [0, 1], as in Section 1, and their
ﬁxed cost of participating in the labor force κ ∈ R+.26 An agent with types (i, κ) has
idiosyncratic preferences over consumption c and labor supply l described by ui (c, l)−
κ I{l>0}, where the utility function ui is a general, twice continuously diﬀerentiable
function that satisﬁes u′i,c > 0, u
′′
i,cc ≤ 0, u′i,l, u′′i,ll < 0, and where I{l>0} is an indicator
function equal to 1 if the agent is employed. If the agent decides to work, he earns a
wage wi, chooses his labor supply (hours) li, earns pre-tax labor income yi = wili, and
achieves a strictly higher welfare improvement, since the ﬁrst-order welfare measures are linear in µ
by construction.
26These two characteristics can be arbitrarily correlated in the population.
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pays a labor income tax T (yi).
27 If he decides to stay non-employed, his labor supply
is equal to zero and he earns the government-provided transfer −T (0). Finally, he
also owns an exogenous quantity ki of the economy's capital stock, which earns a
pre-tax return r.28 Capital income is taxed at the constant rate τ .
The maximization problem of agent (i, κ) reads
Ui,κ ≡ max
{
max
l>0
ui (ci (l) , l)− κ ; ui (ci (0) , 0)
}
. (24)
where ci (l) is deﬁned by the budget constraint: ci (l) = wil−T (wil)+(1− τ) r ki for
any l ≥ 0. Conditional on working, agent (i, κ) chooses labor supply li that satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition
−u
′
i,l (ci (li) , li)
u′i,c (ci (li) , li)
= [1− T ′ (wili)] wi. (25)
We assume that li is the unique solution to this problem. Moreover, the agent decides
to participate if and only if his ﬁxed cost of work κ is smaller than a threshold κ∗i ,
given by
κ∗i = ui [wili − T (wili) + (1− τ) r ki , li]− ui [−T (0) + (1− τ) r ki , 0] . (26)
Denote by fi (κ) the density of κ conditional on skill i and by Li = li
´ κ∗i
0
fi (κ) dκ the
total amount of labor supplied by workers of skill i.
Firms produce output using the aggregate labor supply Li of each type i ∈ [0, 1]
and the aggregate capital stock K, which we assume to be in ﬁxed supply. The
aggregate production function is denoted by F ({Li}i∈[0,1] , K). We assume that F
has constant returns to scale. In equilibrium, ﬁrms earn no proﬁts and the wage wi
is equal to the marginal product of type-i labor, i.e.,
wi = F
′
i ({Lj}j∈[0,1] , K). (27)
The equilibrium interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital, i.e., r =
27As in Section 1, we order skills so that there is a one-to-one map between skills i and wages wi
in the initial equilibrium with tax schedule T . See Appendix A.2 for details.
28We impose that all agents with a given skill i, i.e. a given wage wi, own the same amount of
capital, which ensures that they all choose the same level of labor supply (conditional on working)
li, independent of their ﬁxed cost of working. We discuss this assumption in Appendix A.2.
24
F ′K({Lj}j∈[0,1] , K).
The government levies taxes on labor and capital incomes. The initial labor
income tax schedule is twice continuously diﬀerentiable but is allowed to be arbitrarily
nonlinear. We deﬁne the local rate of progressivity of the tax schedule as (minus) the
elasticity of the retention rate (1− T ′ (y)) with respect to gross income y: p (y) =
−∂ ln(1−T ′(y))
∂ ln y
. Finally, we restrict the initial tax schedule and tax reforms on capital
income to be linear.
2.2 The welfare compensation problem
We deﬁne an exogenous wage disruption analogously to Section 1.2, and denote by
µrˆE the corresponding disruption to the interest rate, i.e., the diﬀerence between
the marginal productivities of capital before and after the shock, keeping individual
labor supplies ﬁxed at their pre-disruption level. The government can implement an
arbitrarily nonlinear reform µTˆ of the labor income tax schedule, and a reform of
the capital income tax rate by µτˆ . In response to a disruption (µwˆE, µrˆE) and a tax
reform (µTˆ , µτˆ), individuals optimally adjust their labor supply and participation
decisions. In general equilibrium, this further impacts their wage and the interest
rate, which in turn aﬀects again their labor supply choices, and so on. We denote
by µwˆi, µrˆ, µlˆi and µκˆ
∗
i the total endogenous changes in individual i's wage, interest
rate, labor supply (conditional on working) and participation threshold, respectively,
following the disruption and tax reform. That is, in the disrupted economy we have
w˜i = wi + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi, r˜ = r + µrˆ
E + µrˆ, l˜i = li + µlˆi and κ˜
∗
i = κ
∗
i + µκˆ
∗
i . We ﬁnally
denote by U˜i,κ = Ui,κ + µUˆi,κ the resulting indirect utility of agents with type (i, κ)
in the ﬁnal equilibrium. The welfare compensation problem consists of designing a
reform (µTˆ , µτˆ) of the tax system such that the welfare of every agent is the same as
it was before the wage disruption; that is, U˜i,κ = Ui,κ for all (i, κ) ∈ [0, 1]× R+.
We start by proving that if the government implements the welfare compensating
policy, then it must be the case that no agent switches participation status, i.e., κˆ∗i = 0
for all i. Indeed, ﬁrst note that we can always choose to adjust the capital income
tax rate by τˆ
1−τ =
rˆ
r
, so that the net of tax return (1− τ) r, and hence the capital
income of each agent, remains constant. Thus, we can leave unchanged the welfare
ui[−T (0)+(1− τ) r ki , 0] of agents who are non-employed both before and after the
perturbation by keeping the unemployment transfer −T (0) unaﬀected. Moreover, in
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order to leave unchanged the welfare of agents who are employed both before and after
the perturbation, the combination of the wage disruption and the tax reform must
make the utility U˜i ≡ ui[w˜il˜i−T (w˜il˜i)−µTˆ (w˜il˜i) + (1− τ) r ki , l˜i] equal to its initial
value Ui for all i. Now, since the participation decision (26) of an individual with
skill i depends only on the diﬀerence between the utilities conditional on employment
and on non-employment, we obtain that the participation threshold κ∗i must also
remain constant for all i. That is, in order to leave everyone's welfare unchanged, the
compensating tax reform must ensure that the individuals who were employed (resp.,
non-employed) before the disruption remain so in the new equilibrium.29
The welfare compensation problem therefore consists of constructing a labor in-
come tax reform Tˆ such that the welfare of each employed agent in the disrupted
economy is equal to their welfare in the initial equilibrium:
Ui = U˜i ≡ ui[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i) + (1− τ) r ki , l˜i], (28)
where (w˜i, l˜i) are deﬁned by the perturbed ﬁrst-order condition
− u
′
i,l[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i]
u′i,c[w˜il˜i − T (w˜il˜i)− µTˆ (w˜il˜i) + (1− τ) rki, l˜i]
= [1−T ′(w˜il˜i)−µTˆ ′(w˜il˜i)]w˜i, (29)
and the perturbed wage equation
w˜i = F˜
′
i ({Lj + LˆEj + µlˆj}j∈[0,1] , K˜). (30)
As in Section 1, our goal is to characterize analytically the solution to the welfare
compensation problem for marginal wage disruptions, i.e., as µ→ 0. The proofs are
gathered in the Appendix.
2.3 Elasticity concepts
We ﬁrst deﬁne the elasticities εS,ri , ε
S,w
i and ε
S,n
i of labor supply li with respect to the
retention rate ri ≡ 1− T ′ (wili), the wage wi, and the non-labor (lump-sum) income
29This implies in particular that the values of the elasticities of participation with respect to the
tax rates (which otherwise would matter to determine the endogenous wage adjustments wˆi) are
irrelevant for the construction of the compensating tax reform.
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ni, as
εS,ri ≡
∂ ln li
∂ ln ri
=
eci
1 + p (yi) eci
, εS,wi ≡
∂ ln li
∂ lnwi
=
(1− p (yi)) eci + eni
1 + p (yi) eci
, εS,ni ≡ ri
∂ ln li
∂ni
=
eni
1 + p (yi) eci
,
where eci is the standard Hicksian (compensated) elasticity of labor supply, and e
n
i
is the standard income eﬀect parameter, deﬁned by the Slutsky equation eni = e
u
i −
eci , where e
u
i is the Marshallian (uncompensated) elasticity of labor supply. The
interpretation of these variables is identical to those in Section 1.1, and their formal
closed-form expressions are given by equations in the Appendix.
Second, as in Section 1.1, we deﬁne the cross-wage (resp., own-wage) elasticity of
skill j with respect to the labor supply of skill i (resp., j) as
γi,j ≡ ∂ lnwi
∂ lnLj
=
LjF ′′ij (L, K)
F ′i (L, K)
, − 1
εDj
≡ ∂ lnwj
∂ lnLj
− lim
i→j
∂ lnwi
∂ lnLj
,
where F ′′ij denotes the second partial derivative of the production function with re-
spect to the variables (Li, Lj). The interpretations of these expressions are identical
to those in Section 1.1, except that for a general (non-CES) production function F ,
the cross-wage elasticities γi,j now depend on both skills i and j, and the own-wage
elasticities 1/εDj depend on the skill j and hence are no longer constant.
2.4 Compensation in Partial Equilibrium
As in Section 1.4, we start by assuming that wages are exogenous. Equation (11) holds
in our more general environment with arbitrary preferences and an arbitrary initial
tax system. As a result, the compensating tax reform in partial equilibrium is still
given by Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi wˆ
E
i
wi
. With preferences that are no longer quasilinear,
however, the change in labor supply of agent i can now be expressed in terms of the
elasticity notations introduced in Section 2.1 as:
lˆpei
li
= εS,wi
wˆEi
wi
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi . (31)
In addition to the changes in the exogenous wage wˆEi and in the marginal tax rate
Tˆ ′ (yi) already discussed in the context of equation (12), a third variable now causes
an adjustment in the labor supply of agent i: namely, the change in his average tax
rate Tˆ (yi) /yi induces a response of hours determined by the income eﬀect parameter
εS,ni .
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2.5 Compensation in General Equilibrium
We now turn to the general-equilibrium model and follow the same steps as in Section
1.5. A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of the perturbed wage equation (30) leads to
wˆi
wi
= − 1
εDi
lˆi
li
+
ˆ 1
0
γi,j
lˆj
lj
dj. (32)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-constant own- and cross-wage elastic-
ities) equation (14) in the simpler model of Section 1 and has the same economic
interpretation.
A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of equation (28) around the initial equilibrium
implies that the change in the indirect utility of agent i induced by the wage disruption
and the tax reform (weighted by the marginal utility of consumption to obtain a
monetary measure of welfare), Uˆi/u
′
c,i, is given by:
0 =
Uˆi
u′i,cs
= (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
[
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
]
− Tˆ (yi) . (33)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-quasilinear preferences) equation (15)
in the simpler model of Section 1 and has the same economic interpretation.
A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of equation (28), which imposes that the labor
supply of agent i remains optimal in the disrupted economy, can be written as:
lˆi
li
= εS,wi
[
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
]
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi . (34)
This equation generalizes (to the case of non-constant elasticities and non-quasilinear
preferences) equation (16) in the simpler model of Section 1 and has the same eco-
nomic interpretation, except that labor supply now also adjusts in response to a
change in the average tax rate Tˆ (yi) /yi by an amount given by the income eﬀect
parameter εS,ni .
Substituting for the endogenous wage adjustment wˆi in equation (34) and using
(32) leads to an integral equation for the labor supply changes of all agents, {lˆj}j∈[0,1].
The following lemma, which generalizes Lemma 2 derived in the simpler model of
Section 1 and which follows from Proposition 1 in Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin
[2016], gives the closed-form solution to this equation.
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Lemma 2. Assume that
´
[0,1]2
∣∣∣δiεS,wi γij∣∣∣2 didj < 1.30 The solution to (34) is given
by: for all i ∈ [0, 1],
lˆi
li
= δi
lˆpei
li
+ δi ε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γi,j δj
lˆpej
lj
dj, (35)
where lˆpei is deﬁned by (31), δi ≡ 1/[1 + ε
S,w
i
εDi
], and Γi,j ≡
∑∞
n=0 Γ
(n)
i,j with Γ
(0)
i,j = γi,j
and for all n ≥ 1, Γ(n)i,j =
´ 1
0
Γ
(n−1)
i,k δkε
S,w
k γk,j dk.
Equation (35) has the same structure and interpretation as (17) in the simpler
model of Section 1, except that the expression for the total cross-wage eﬀect Γi,j is
now deﬁned by a series
∑∞
n=0 Γ
(n)
i,j . Recall that, in contrast to the structural elasticity
γi,j, the variable Γi,j captures the adjustment in the wage of type i caused by a
change in the labor supply of type j, accounting for the inﬁnite sequence of feedback
cross-wage eﬀects between diﬀerent skills that occur in general equilibrium. First,
the initial change in type-j labor supply, δj lˆ
pe
j /lj, directly aﬀects the wage of type i
through the structural elasticity γi,j  this is the ﬁrst term Γ
(0)
i,j in the series deﬁning
Γi,j. Second, the change in labor supply of type j aﬀects the wage of every other
type k by γk,j, hence the labor supply of type k by δkε
S,w
k γk,j, which in turn impacts
the wage of type i by γi,kδkε
S,w
k γk,j  this is the second term Γ
(1)
i,j . By induction, Γ
(n)
i,j
represents the adjustment in wi through the behavior of (n− 1) intermediate types,
e.g., for n = 3, j → k1 → k2 → i.31
Taking stock. As in the simpler model of Section 1, individual welfare is now
aﬀected both by the average tax rates and the marginal tax rates, because by aﬀecting
agents' labor supplies the latter impact their wages and hence utilities. As a result,
equation (33) does not directly lead to a formula for the compensating tax reform:
we need to solve for the ﬁxed point between the average and marginal tax rates of the
compensation. However, because of the non-constant elasticities and the presence of
30This condition ensures that the series deﬁning Γi,j converges. The assumptions made in Section
1 provide suﬃcient conditions on primitives such that this condition is satisﬁed.
31Note that in the simpler version of the model of Section 1, we showed that the total cross-wage
eﬀect Γi,j is equal to the structural elasticity γi,j ampliﬁed by the factor 1/δi. This is because a
CES production function, where γi,j depends only on j, along with constant labor supply elasticities
δkε
S,w
k = δε
S,w, implies that each round of general equilibrium wage adjustment is a constant fraction
of the ﬁrst round.
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income eﬀects in preferences, constructing such a tax reform is more diﬃcult than in
the model of Section 1.
Before proceeding to the analytical solution to the compensation problem, we
summarize the various ways through which taxes aﬀect welfare in the general model.
Suppose for simplicity that the cross-wage elasticities γi,j are positive for all i 6= j.
A higher average tax rate at income y∗, Tˆ (y∗) > 0, implies:32 (a) a reduction in
welfare of agent y∗, by directly making him poorer, as in partial equilibrium (third
term in equation (33)); (b) a reduction in welfare of agent y∗, by making him work
more (income eﬀect, third term in (31)) and hence earn a lower wage (decreasing
marginal product, ﬁrst term in (32));33 (c) an increase in welfare of all agents y 6=
y∗, whose wage increases due to the higher labor supply of agent y∗ (production
complementarities, second term in (32)). Moreover, a higher marginal tax rate at
income y∗, Tˆ ′ (y∗) > 0, implies: (a) a higher average tax rate for all incomes y > y∗,
since Tˆ (y) =
´ y
0
Tˆ ′ (x) dx, which has analogous welfare consequences to those we just
described; (b) an increase in welfare of agent y∗, by making him work less, as in
partial equilibrium (substitution eﬀect, second term in (31)), and hence earn a higher
wage (decreasing marginal product, ﬁrst term in (32)); (c) a reduction in welfare of
all agents y 6= y∗, whose wage decreases due to the lower labor supply of agent y∗
(production complementarities, second term in (32)).
Main result. The next Theorem, which generalizes Proposition 2, gives a closed-
form characterization of the compensating tax reform in response to any wage dis-
ruption in general equilibrium. This is the main result of the paper.34
Theorem 1. Consider a marginal disruption in the direction wˆE = {wˆEi }i∈[0,1] of
the wage distribution w. The following tax reform Tˆ solves the welfare compensation
32For simplicity we ignore the eﬀects of the changes in the average and marginal tax rates on
wages and welfare through agents' participation decisions, since we argued above that no agent
switches participation status if the government implements the correct compensating reform.
33Because the cross-wage elasticities γi,j , and hence Γi,j , are positive, the wage and welfare
of agent y∗ are still reduced after taking into account the second, third, etc. rounds of general
equilibrium spillovers. This follows from equation (43) in the Appendix. The same reasoning applies
for the next bullet points.
34Note that since there is a one-to-one map between types i and incomes yi, we can change
variables and index by income the wages wyi ≡ wi, labor supplies lyi ≡ li, wage disruptions wˆEyi ≡
wˆEi , and elasticities ε
S,x
yi ≡ εS,xi for x ∈ {r, w, n}, εDyi ≡ εDi , and γyi,yj ≡ γi,j/y′ (j), Γyi,yj ≡
Γi,j/y
′ (j).
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problem: for all i,
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yj
[
ΩˆEyj +
ˆ y¯
y
Λyj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
]
dyj, (36)
where the modiﬁed wage disruption variable ΩˆE is deﬁned by
ΩˆEyj ≡ δyj
wˆEyj
wyj
+ δyj
ˆ y¯
y
Γyj ,yk δykε
S,w
yk
wˆEyk
wyk
dyk, (37)
the progressivity variable E is deﬁned by
E yi,yj ≡
εDyj
δyjε
S,r
yj yj
e
− ´ yjyi
[
εDyk
+2ε
S,n
yk
ε
S,r
yk
]
dyk
yk
, (38)
and the compensation-of-compensation variable Λyi,yj ≡
∑∞
n=0 Λ
(n)
yi,yj is deﬁned by
Λ(0)yi,yj = δyi Γyi,yj ε
D
yj
− δyi
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,yk ε
D
yk
E yk,yj dyk, (39)
and for all n ≥ 1, Λ(n)yi,yj =
´ y¯
y
Λ
(n−1)
yi,yk δyk Λ
(0)
yk,yj dyk. Corollary 2 in the Appendix gives
the ﬁscal surplus Rˆ(wˆE).
Analogously to equation (18), formula (36) features three departures from the
partial-equilibrium compensation (13). First, the modiﬁed wage disruption ΩˆE ac-
counts for the full incidence on wages of the initial shock, and has the same interpre-
tation as (19). Second, the progressivity variable E is a direct generalization of (20),
and has the same interpretation.35
Third, the compensation-of-compensation term (the integral in the square brackets
of (36)), which accounts for the cross-wage eﬀects originating from the skill comple-
mentarities in production, is now more complex than in (18). Indeed, the functional
equation (23) is more diﬃcult to solve when the labor supply of type k does not have
the same impact on the wage of two diﬀerent skills j, j′, so that Γyj ,yk can depend
arbitrarily on yj. Our proof shows that for each k, the welfare impact of these indirect
35It is immediate to show that expression (38) reduces to (20) when the labor supply and demand
elasticities are constant and there are no income eﬀects , so that
εDyk
+2εS,nyk
εS,ryk
= ε
D
εS,r
is a constant.
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wage adjustments is determined by the ﬁrst term Λ
(0)
yj ,yk in the series Λyj ,yk deﬁned
in (39), so that the total eﬀect on type j is given by
´ y¯
y
Λ
(0)
yj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk. This welfare
change needs to be itself compensated using the tax schedule, thus leading to the term
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
´ y¯
yi
E yi,yj [
´ y¯
y
Λ
(0)
yj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk]dyj in (36). In turn, the marginal tax rates of
this second round of compensation generate further wage and welfare changes for
all of the agents. These again must be compensated (third round of compensating
the compensation), leading to the term (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
´ y¯
yi
E yi,yj [
´ y¯
y
Λ
(1)
yj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk]dyj
in (36). The full sequence of tax reforms that achieves the ﬁxed point of the compen-
sation problem is constructed by deﬁning inductively the sequence of variables Λ
(n)
yi,yj
for all n ≥ 0, where each Λ(n)yi,yj captures one round of iterated compensation.
3 Compensating the Impact of Robots
In this ﬁnal section, we show how our theoretical results can be straightforwardly
implemented in an empirical application: compensating the welfare consequences of
robotization in the U.S. and the German economies. For reasons of space the analysis
of Germany is in Appendix B.1.
The data on the impact of robots in the U.S. are obtained from the 1990 and 2007
Censuses and were provided to us by Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo. Speciﬁ-
cally, Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017] estimate the impact of industrial automation on
diﬀerent skill cells deﬁned by age, gender, education and race. They give the baseline
size and employment rate (share with salaried jobs), hourly wage, and hours worked
per year of each group. Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017] then estimate the impact of
one additional robot per thousand workers in each skill cell on log-wages, hours and
employment rate.36 These estimates are obtained by comparing two people in the
same cell but who reside in commuting zones with diﬀerent exposure to industrial
automation. They include both the direct eﬀects of robots on employment and wages
and any indirect spillover eﬀects that might arise because of a resulting decline in
local demand. In other words, they estimate the modiﬁed disruption ΩˆE rather than
wˆE.
We assume that the economy is described by the model of Section 1. The initial tax
schedule is CRP with p = 0.156 and τ = −3 (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
[2016]). The production function is CES with εD = 0.6 (Dustmann, Frattini, and
36This corresponds to the increase in robots observed in the US between 1990 and 2007.
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Preston [2013]), εD = 1.5, or εD = ∞ (partial equilibrium). We estimate the labor
supply elasticity in their data37 and ﬁnd εS,r = 0.47, which is in the range of the
empirical estimates. The left panel of Figure 1 plots the wage disruption (i.e., the
percentage change in the wage) along the baseline (1990) earnings distribution, as
well as the standard errors. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we group agents
by wage deciles, so that the values of the wage disruption 100× wˆi
wi
(in the y-axis) are
those reported in Figure 13 of Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017]. This ﬁgure shows that
the change in the wage due to automation is increasing with the agent's position in
the income distribution. The lowest wages in 1990 are reduced by 1.84%, while the
80th and 90th percentiles experience an estimated increase in their wage of 0.31%
and 0.34%.
We can now apply our theoretical formulas (13) and (18) to this disruption. In the
right panel of Figure 1, we plot the implied income losses (dashed magenta curve), as
well as the compensating tax reform Tˆ (solid blue curve) obtained in the partial equi-
librium environment (formula (13)). The partial-equilibrium compensation corrects
for the fact that the initial tax schedule is progressive but otherwise tracks one-for-
one the shape of the income gains and losses. The 10th income percentile ($5,500 per
year) have their tax bill reduced by $100 (i.e., 110% of their income loss), while the
90th income percentile ($62,000 per year) face a tax increase of $160 per year (i.e.,
76% of their income gain).38
Figure 1: Wage disruption (left) and Partial-equilibrium compensation (right)
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37See Appendix B.1 for details.
38Formula (13) implies that the ratio of the tax change to the income disruption is larger than
100% for low-income agents and then decreasing, because the marginal tax rate T ′ (yi) of the initial
tax schedule is negative at the bottom and then increasing.
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The left panel of Figure 2 plots the compensation in general equilibrium. The
dashed magenta curve gives the gross income losses caused by the exogenous disrup-
tion, and the solid red (resp., blue) curve gives the tax changes Tˆ (yi) for ε
D = 0.6
(resp., εD = 1.5). Importantly, since the tax change at a given income y in formula
(18) depends on the disruption aﬀecting agents with incomes larger than y and up
to the top of the income distribution y¯, we need to make an assumption about the
disruption on incomes higher than the largest in our dataset (about $60,000). In
Figure 2 we make the conservative assumption that incomes above $60,000 incur the
same wage disruption as those who earn $60,000, i.e., their wage increases by 0.34%.
In the Appendix (Figure 4), we assume that the size of the wage disruption continues
to increase linearly above $60,000, albeit at a slow rate  agents with an income 20
times larger face a disruption that is 3 times larger, i.e., their wage increases by 1.02%
due to robots.
Figure 2: General-equilibrium compensation (left) and Average tax changes (right)
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To compensate their income loss, low-income agents get a tax rebate equal to $113
if εD = 0.6 (i.e., 111.9% of their income loss) or $120 if εD = 1.5 (i.e., 118.9% of their
income loss). To redistribute their income gain, high-income agents face an increase
in their tax payment equal to $260 if εD = 0.6 (i.e., 124% of their income gain) or
$198 if εD = 1.5 (i.e., 94% of their income gain). The right panel of Figure 2 plots the
changes in the average tax rates induced by the reform, i.e. Tˆ (yi) /yi. The average tax
rate on low incomes is reduced by 2.1 percentage points (resp., 2.18 pp) if εD = 0.6
(resp., εD = 1.5), while that on high incomes is increased by 0.42 pp (resp., 0.32 pp).
Recall that these numbers are for one additional robot per thousand workers; when
more robots are introduced, the compensation should be scaled accordingly. Finally,
applying the formula of Corollary 2, we obtain that the the robot-induced disruption
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generates a small ﬁscal surplus equal to $16 if εD = 0.6, but a small ﬁscal deﬁcit of
$11.5 if εD = 1.5 and a deﬁcit of $37.3 in partial equilibrium.
Note that the trade-oﬀ between compensating the welfare gains and losses using
average versus marginal tax rates implies that the tax increases must be front-loaded
in general equilibrium, in order to not generate increases in tax rates as steep as the
income disruption (e.g., between $25,000 and $45,000). Note moreover that at the
top, the increase in the tax payment is larger than the increase in income caused
by the disruption, and larger than the partial-equilibrium compensation. This is be-
cause these agents also face an increase in their marginal tax rate, which raises their
welfare and compensates for the diﬀerence between their larger tax bill and their
beneﬁt from automation. Therefore, while optimal taxation analyses typically sug-
gest that trickle-down forces imply lower marginal tax rates at the top in general
equilibrium (Stiglitz [1982b], Rothschild and Scheuer [2013], Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet
[2015a], Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016]), the compensation exercise by con-
trast requires higher marginal (and average) tax increases on high incomes than in
partial equilibrium in response to a positive wage disruption: the compensation at the
90th percentile is 1.6 times higher once the general-equilibrium forces (progressivity
variable and compensation-of-compensation in formula (18)) are taken into account.
Finally, using the data and empirical estimates of Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum,
and Woessner [2017] for Germany between 1994 and 2014, we ﬁnd in Appendix B.1
that the wage of all the workers decreased from being exposed to robots, and that the
exposure and hence the corresponding income losses were larger for higher-income
agents. As a result, we show that workers at the 10th percentile of the distribution
should have their tax bill reduced by 310% of their income loss, while those at the
90th percentile should have theirs reduced by 150% of their income loss, representing
in both cases a 1.4 percentage point reduction in the average tax rate.
Conclusion
A classic policy question of compensating winners and losers from an economic dis-
ruption becomes quite involved when the environment features both distortionary
taxes and general equilibrium. At the same time, both of these considerations are
important in many applied and policy questions. We provide a general closed-form
formula for the design of the welfare-compensating tax reform in general equilibrium.
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This equation has a clear economic meaning and is easy to implement in practical ap-
plications. In Appendix A.6 we discuss the advantages of the compensation approach
over the traditional optimal taxation approach.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Partial equilibrium
We start by characterizing the welfare compensating tax reform and its ﬁscal surplus in partial
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (11), and hence the formula (13) for the compensating tax
reform, follow immediately from the proof of equations (15) and (33) below. Equation (12) follows
from the proof of equations (16) and (34) below. Here we only expand on the ﬁrst-order Taylor
expansion of equation (6) around the initial equilibrium (i.e., as µ→ 0). It reads
w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− l˜
1+ 1e
i
1 + 1e
− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) = wili − T (wili)− l
1+ 1e
i
1 + 1e
− µTˆ (wili)
+µ (1− T ′ (wili))
(
wi lˆi + liwˆ
E
i
)
− µl 1ei lˆi. (40)
This equation can be simpliﬁed by recognizing that (1− T ′ (wili))wi lˆi − l
1
e
i lˆi = 0, which follows
immediately from the ﬁrst-order condition (2), or from the envelope theorem: since individuals
choose their labor supply optimally before the perturbation, their labor supply adjustment lˆi induces
no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare. Therefore, imposing that agent i keeps the same level of welfare in
the disrupted economy (once the new tax schedule is implemented) as in the initial equilibrium,
i.e. Uˆi ≡ U˜i − Ui = 0, leads to equation (11).
We now derive the budget impact of the wage disruption and its compensation. We deﬁne the
ﬁscal surplus as
µRˆ(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
[
T (w˜i l˜i) + µTˆ (w˜i l˜i)− T (wili)
]
di. (41)
Corollary 1. Suppose that there is inﬁnite substitutability between skills in production, i.e., εD →
∞. Consider a marginal disruption of the wage distribution w in the direction wˆE = {wˆEi }i∈[0,1].
The ﬁscal surplus of the wage disruption wˆE and the compensating tax reform Tˆ , deﬁned by (13),
is given by
Rˆ(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
[
wˆEi
wi
+ T ′ (yi)
lˆi
li
]
yi di, (42)
where the labor supply change lˆi of agent i following the wage disruption and the tax reform is given
by (12).
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Proof. The eﬀect of the wage disruption and the corresponding compensating tax reform on gov-
ernment budget is given by
R(wˆE) = lim
µ→0
1
µ
{ˆ 1
0
[
T (wi l˜i) + µTˆ (wi l˜i)
]
f (i) di−
ˆ 1
0
T (wili) f (i) di
}
=
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) f (i) di+
ˆ 1
0
(
wˆEi
wi
+
lˆi
li
)
wiliT
′ (wili) f (i) di,
where f is the (uniform) density of skills in the initial economy. Using equation (13), we can rewrite
this expression as
R(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi wˆ
E
i
wi
f (i) di+
ˆ 1
0
(
wˆEi
wi
+
lˆi
li
)
yiT
′ (yi) f (i) di,
which easily leads to equation (42).
The interpretation of formula (42) is as follows. Consider an individual i who earns income
yi = wili ∈ [y, y¯] before the disruption. His wage changes by wˆEi , so that his income (absent
any labor supply responses) changes by liwˆ
E
i =
yi
wi
wˆEi . The government keeps a share T
′ (yi) of
this income change. Moreover, by equation (13), the government raises the agent's tax liability by
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiwi wˆEi . Therefore tax revenue increases by T ′ (yi)
yi
wi
wˆEi +(1− T ′ (yi)) yiwi wˆEi =
yi
wi
wˆEi . This is the ﬁrst term in the square brackets of expression (42). Second, the wage disruption
and the compensating tax reform lead the agent to adjust (say, reduce) his labor supply by lˆi, given
by (12). This lowers government revenue by a fraction T ′ (yi) of the corresponding income loss
wi lˆi = yi
lˆi
li
. This yields the second term in the square brackets of (42). Summing over all agents
i ∈ [0, 1] leads to the total change in government revenue Rˆ(wˆE). Note that (42) is a closed-form
expression, since it depends only on the exogenous wage disruption wˆE and on the characteristics
of the undisrupted economy.
Note that the government is able to compensate the gains and losses from the wage disruption in
a budget-neutral way, taking into account the labor supply distortions that such redistribution will
induce, if and only if Rˆ(wˆE) ≥ 0. It is thus possible that a shock to the economy (say, technological
change, immigration inﬂow, or opening to international trade) generates strictly positive aggregate
gains, both in terms of gross incomes for the agents (i.e., E[ yiwi wˆ
E
i ] > 0), and in terms of government
revenue (i.e., E[T ′ (yi) yiwi wˆ
E
i ] > 0), but that these gains are not redistributable (i.e., Rˆ(wˆE) < 0),
because the labor supply distortions generated by the disruption and/or by the compensating tax
reform Tˆ outweigh the aggregate gains of the initial economic shock.
A.2 General equilibrium: Linearization of the equilibrium con-
ditions
We now analyze the welfare compensation problem in general equilibrium. Without loss of generality
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we order skills so that there is a one-to-one map between skills i and wages wi in the initial equilibrium
with tax schedule T . We assume in addition that there is a one-to-one map between wages wi and
earnings yi = wi × li, i.e. that incomes yi are increasing in skills i. This is satisﬁed in particular if
the agents' utility functions ui are the same for all agents i and the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing
condition holds (that is, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and pre-tax income
−u′l/ (wu′c) is decreasing in w). See Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] for details.
Note moreover that we impose that all agents with a given skill i, i.e. a given wage wi, own the
same amount of capital, which ensures that they all choose the same level of labor supply (conditional
on working) li, independent of their ﬁxed cost of working. We can easily relax this restriction by
assuming that agents i who are employed in the initial equilibrium own a diﬀerent amount of capital
than agents with the same skill i but who are not employed. However, if we allowed the level of
capital (and hence labor supply) to vary more generally with the ﬁxed cost of working κ, a tax
system that consists of a labor income tax schedule and a constant capital tax rate would not be
suﬃcient to compensate the impact of arbitrary wage disruptions, unless individual preferences have
no income eﬀects on labor supply.
Integro-Diﬀerential Algebraic Equations (IDAE). We ﬁrst show that if the pro-
duction function is CES, the welfare compensation problem (6)-(7)-(8) with U˜i = Ui in (6) has
a particular mathematical structure. The unknown functions to solve for are (Tˆ , lˆ). Ignoring for
now the wage equation (8), the system consists of (i) a diﬀerential equation (7), which involves the
derivative Tˆ ′ of the tax function, arising from the requirement that the ﬁrst order conditions of the
agents remain satisﬁed following the disruption and the tax reform; (ii) an algebraic component
(6), which features only the unknown functions (Tˆ , lˆ) but not their derivatives, arising from the
requirement that the indirect utility of agents remains at the level deﬁned by their pre-disruption
utility (the level set constraint). This is a system of Diﬀerential Algebraic Equations (DAE).39
The diﬃculty in the analysis of such a system, relative to a standard system of diﬀerential
equations, is that the Jacobian of the implicit ODE is singular due to the presence of the algebraic
constraint that does not include the derivatives of the unknown function.40 The DAEs can be
viewed as diﬀerential equations on manifolds.41 The algebraic constraint forms a manifold, and the
literature proceeds by analyzing the behavior of the suitably projected diﬀerential equation.
Now note that there is in addition (iii) an integral component to the system: both equations (6)
and (7) depend on an integral of the function lˆ via the wage equation (8) along with the deﬁnition
of the CES production function. This implies that (6)-(7)-(8) is a system of Integro-Diﬀerential
Algebraic Equations (IDAE).42
39The DAE theory is recent (Ascher and Petzold [1998], p. 231). See Kunkel and Mehrmann
[2006] for the ﬁrst textbook treatment of this topic.
40See Ascher and Petzold [1998], p. 231.
41Rheinboldt [1984], Hairer and Wanner [1996], Chapters VI and VII, Brunner [2004], Chapter 8
42Lamour, März, and Tischendorf [2013] (p. xxi) argue that the IDAEs are a special case of
abstract diﬀerential-algebraic equations (ADAE), so that the methods of analysis of the DAEs are
applicable.
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The main technical challenge of the paper is to solve the resulting system of IDAE. We leave
the details to the appendix and brieﬂy outline the strategy of the proofs here. First, we follow
Hairer and Wanner [1996] (Chapter VI) and Kunkel and Mehrmann [2006] (Chapter 4) to linearize
the system of nonlinear IDAEs (i.e., we focus on marginal wage disruptions). This allows us to
to transform the system of nonlinear IDAE into one integro-diﬀerential equation.43 Second, we
then follow Vainberg [1964] and Shishkin [2007] to derive the analytical solution to the resulting
integro-diﬀerential equation.
Linearization. We ﬁrst derive the impact of any exogenous disruption and tax reform on wages.
Proof of equations (14) and (32). Consider an exogenous disruption µFˆE of the initial econ-
omy's production function and a tax reform µTˆ , with µ > 0 (the proof extends immediately to a
disruption of the aggregate labor supply distribution or the aggregate capital stock). The corre-
sponding wage disruption is deﬁned by
wˆEi =
∂FˆE
∂Li
({Lj}j∈[0,1],K).
Denote by µwˆi and µlˆi the ﬁrst-order endogenous changes as µ → 0 in the wage and labor supply
of type i, and let w˜i = wi + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi and l˜i = li + µlˆi. In the perturbed equilibrium, the wage is
equal to the marginal product of the labor of the corresponding type:
w˜i =
∂[F + µFˆE ]
∂Li
({Lj + µlˆj}j∈[0,1],K).
A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion in µ → 0 of this equation around the initial equilibrium yields the
following expression for the Gateaux derivative of the wage functional:
wˆi ≡ lim
µ→0
1
µ
(
w˜i − wi − µwˆEi
)
= lim
µ→0
1
µ
[
∂[F + µFˆE ]
∂Li
(L+ µlˆ,K)− ∂F
∂Li
(L,K)− µ∂Fˆ
E
∂Li
(L,K)
]
=
[
lˆi
∂2F (L,K)
∂L2i
− lˆi lim
j→i
∂2F (L,K)
∂Li∂Lj
]
+
ˆ 1
0
lˆj
∂2F (L,K)
∂Li∂Lj
dj.
Therefore, using the deﬁnitions of the structural cross-wage and own-wage elasticities (10), we obtain
43Rabier and Rheinboldt [1990, 1994] provide conditions for the local existence and uniqueness
of solutions of DAEs. März [2011] is perhaps the most comprehensive recent analysis of the con-
ditions under which linearizations are valid (see also Campbell [1995]). Campbell and Griepentrog
[1995] discuss the computational veriﬁcation of solutions. However, complications primarily arise in
complex systems of higher indices (Campbell and Griepentrog [1995]), while our linearized system
is a Hessenberg index-1 DAE (see Hairer and Wanner [1996], p. 374) which poses fewer challenges
(see, e.g., a discussion in März [1995]).
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(since j 7→ wj is continuous as j → i)
wˆi = wi
lˆi
li
[
Li
wi
∂2F (L,K)
∂L2i
− lim
j→i
Li
wj
∂2F (L,K)
∂Li∂Lj
]
+ wi
ˆ 1
0
lˆj
lj
Lj
wi
∂2F (L,K)
∂Li∂Lj
dj
= −wi lˆi
li
1
εDi
+ wi
ˆ 1
0
lˆj
lj
γijdj.
This leads to equation (14). In the model of Section 1, the own wage elasticity εDi is constant and
cross-wage elasticity γij does not depend on i, which implies equation (14).
Next we derive the impact of any exogenous disruption and tax reform on indirect utilities and
impose that the agent's welfare is unchanged.
Proof of equations (15) and (33). Imposing that every employed agent's welfare is the same
after the disruption and the tax reform as in the initial equilibrium reads: for all i ∈ [0, 1],
Ui = ui[w˜i l˜i − T (w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ (w˜i l˜i) + (1− τ − µτˆ) r˜ki, l˜i].
Recall that the reform of the capital income tax rate ensures that (1− τ − µτˆ) r˜ki = (1− τ) rki ≡
Rki. A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion in µ→ 0 of this equation yields
0 = Uˆi = ui
[
wili − T (wili) + µ (1− T ′ (wili))
(
wi lˆi + liwˆ
E
i + liwˆi
)
− µTˆ (wili) +Rki, li + µlˆi
]
−ui [wili − T (wili) +Rki, li]
= µ
[
(1− T ′ (wili))
(
wi lˆi + liwˆ
E
i + liwˆi
)
− Tˆ (wili)
]
u′i,c + µlˆiu
′
i,l
= µ
[
(1− T ′ (wili)) yi
(
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
)
− Tˆ (wili)
]
u′i,c,
where the last equality follows from the ﬁrst order condition (2). This leads to equation (15).
Finally we derive the impact of any exogenous disruption and tax reform on individual intensive-
margin labor supplies, and express it in terms of the behavioral elasticities.
Proof of equations (16) and (34). The perturbed ﬁrst-order condition of skill i reads
0 = [1− T ′(w˜i l˜i)− µTˆ ′(w˜i l˜i)] w˜i u′i,c
[
w˜i l˜i − T
(
w˜i l˜i
)
− µTˆ
(
w˜i l˜i
)
+Rki, l˜i
]
+u′i,l
[
w˜i l˜i − T
(
w˜i l˜i
)
− µTˆ
(
w˜i l˜i
)
+Rki, l˜i
]
,
where w˜i = wi + µwˆ
E
i + µwˆi and l˜i = li + µlˆi. Tedious algebra, the details of which can be found in
Appendix D.1.1 of Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016] implies that the ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion
44
in µ→ 0 of this equation reads
0 =
[
(1− T ′ (yi))wiyiu′i,cc + yiu′i,cl + wiu′i,c − wiyi
T ′′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)u
′
i,c
]
wˆEi + wˆi
wi
+
[
(1− T ′ (yi))w2i u′i,cc + wiu′i,cl + wiu′i,cl +
ull,i
1− T ′ (yi) − w
2
i
T ′′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)u
′
i,c
]
lˆi
− wiu′i,c
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
[
(1− T ′ (yi))wiu′i,cc + u′i,cl
] Tˆ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) .
Solving for lˆi and rearranging implies
lˆi =
−
(
u′i,l
u′
i,c
)2
liu
′′
i,cc+
(
u′i,l
u′
i,c
)
liu
′′
i,cl−
(
1− yiT
′′(yi)
1−T ′(yi)
)
(1−T ′(yi))wiu′′i,c(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
1 + yiT
′′(yi)
1−T ′(yi)
u′
i,l
li(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
wˆEi + wˆi
wi
+
u′i,l
li(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
1 + yiT
′′(yi)
1−T ′(yi)
u′
i,l
li(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
1(
ul,i
uc,i
)yiTˆ ′ (yi)
+
−
(
u′i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc+
(
u′i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cl(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
1 + yiT
′′(yi)
1−T ′(yi)
u′
i,l
li(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)2
u′′i,cc−2
(
u′
i,l
u′
i,c
)
u′′i,cl+u
′′
i,ll
1(
ul,i
uc,i
) Tˆ (yi) ,
and hence, from the standard expressions for the labor supply elasticities eci , e
u
i and income eﬀect
parameter eni = e
u
i − eci (see, e.g., Saez [2001] p. 227), and the elasticities with respect to the
non-linear budget constraint εS,wi , ε
S,r
i , ε
S,n
i ,
lˆi
li
=
eni + (1− p (yi)) eci
1 + p (yi) eci
wˆEi + wˆi
wi
− e
c
i
1 + p (yi) eci
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
eni
1 + p (yi) eci
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
≡ εS,wi
wˆEi + wˆi
wi
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) − ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi ,
which leads to equation (16).
We now solve in closed-form for the labor supply changes {lˆi}i∈[0,1] in the simple version of the
model of Section 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using equations (14) and (16), we obtain that the labor supply adjustments
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{lˆi}i∈[0,1] satisfy the following linear Fredholm integral equation:
lˆi
li
= εS,w
[
wˆEi
wi
− 1
εD
lˆi
li
+
ˆ 1
0
γj
lˆj
lj
dj
]
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
= δεS,w
wˆEi
wi
− δεS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + δε
S,w
ˆ 1
0
γj
lˆj
lj
dj.
Multiplying both sides by γi and integrating over i ∈ [0, 1] implies
ˆ 1
0
γi
lˆi
li
di = δ
ˆ 1
0
γi
[
εS,w
wˆEi
wi
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
di+ δεS,w
[ˆ 1
0
γj
lˆj
lj
dj
] ˆ 1
0
γidi
=
δ
1− δεS,w ´ 1
0
γidi
ˆ 1
0
γi
[
εS,w
wˆEi
wi
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
di.
Now note that
´ 1
0
γidi =
1
εD
´ 1
0
yi
Y¯
di = 1εD , so that 1 − δεS,w
´ 1
0
γidi = δ. Substituting the previous
equation into the integral equation for lˆi/li leads to
lˆi
li
= δ
[
εS,w
wˆEi
wi
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
+ δεS,w
ˆ 1
0
γi
[
εS,w
wˆEi
wi
− εS,r Tˆ
′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
]
di.
This immediately implies equation (17).
Next we solve in closed-form for the labor supply changes {lˆi}i∈[0,1] in the general model of
Section 2. Note that we assume from the outset that the extensive margin responses to the exogenous
disruption and the compensating tax reform are equal to zero.
Proof of Lemma 2. Using equations (32) and (34), we obtain that the labor supply adjustments
{lˆi}i∈[0,1] satisfy the following linear Fredholm integral equation:
lˆi
li
= εS,wi
[
wˆEi
wi
− 1
εDi
lˆi
li
+
ˆ 1
0
γij
lˆj
lj
dj
]
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
= δi
[
εS,wi
wˆEi
wi
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + ε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γij
lˆj
lj
dj.
Denoting the expression in square brackets by lˆpei /li, and substituting for lˆj/lj in the integral leads
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to
lˆi
li
=
δi lˆ
pe
i
li
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γij
[
δj lˆ
pe
j
lj
+ δjε
S,w
j
ˆ 1
0
γjk
lˆk
lk
dk
]
dj
=
[
δi lˆ
pe
i
li
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
γij
δj lˆ
pe
j
lj
dj
]
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
[ˆ 1
0
γikδkε
S,w
k γkjdk
]
lˆj
lj
dj
≡
[
δi lˆ
pe
i
li
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γ
(0)
ij
δj lˆ
pe
j
lj
dj
]
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γ
(1)
ij
lˆj
lj
dj,
where Γ
(0)
ij = γij and Γ
(1)
ij =
´ 1
0
Γ
(0)
ik δkε
S,w
k γkjdk. By induction, it easy to show that for all N ≥ 0,
lˆi
li
=
[
δi lˆ
pe
i
li
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
{
N∑
n=0
Γ
(n)
ij
}
δj lˆ
pe
j
lj
dj
]
+ δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γ
(N+1)
ij
lˆj
lj
dj
where for all n ≥ 0, Γ(n+1)ij =
´ 1
0
Γ
(n)
ik δkε
S,w
k γkjdk. The condition
´ 1
0
´ 1
0
∣∣∣δiεS,wi γij∣∣∣2 didj < 1 ensures
that the series
∑N
n=0 Γ
(n)
ij converges as N →∞ (see the proof of Proposition 1 in Sachs, Tsyvinski,
and Werquin [2016] for details). This implies equation (35). Finally, note that we can write the
endogenous wage changes as
wˆi
wi
= −δiε
S,w
i
εDi
wˆEi
wi
+
δiε
S,r
i
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
δiε
S,n
i
εDi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
+δi
ˆ 1
0
Γijδj
[
εS,wj
wˆEj
wj
− εS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + ε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj, (43)
which follows from equations (31), (34) and (35).
A.3 General equilibrium: Compensating tax reform
We now proceed to the proof of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1. We start by deriving a lemma that
gives a functional equation that the compensating tax reform must satisfy.
Lemma 3. The compensating tax reform Tˆ satisﬁes the following functional equation: for all
i ∈ [0, 1],
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiΩˆEi = −δi
εS,ri
εDi
yiTˆ
′ (yi) + δi
(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)
Tˆ (yi) (44)
+δi
ˆ 1
0
Γijτijδj
[
εS,rj yj Tˆ
′ (yj)− εS,nj Tˆ (yj)
]
dj.
where ΩˆEi ≡ δi wˆ
E
i
wi
+ δi
´ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,w
j
wˆEj
wj
dj and τij ≡ (1−T
′(yi))yi
(1−T ′(yj))yj .
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Proof. Equations (34) and (35) imply that the wage adjustments {wˆi}i∈[0,1] are given by
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
=
1
εS,wi
lˆi
li
+
εS,ri
εS,wi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
εS,ni
εS,wi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
= δi
wˆEi
wi
− (δi − 1) ε
S,r
i
εS,wi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) +
(δi − 1) εS,ni
εS,wi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
+δi
ˆ 1
0
Γij
[
δjε
S,w
j
wˆEj
wj
− δjεS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + δjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj.
Using this equation with δi−1
εS,wi
= − δi
εDi
, we can substitute for
wˆEi
wi
+ wˆiwi in the level set constraint (33)
to rewrite it as
0 = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiδi
[
wˆEi
wi
+
εS,ri
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
εS,ni
εDi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
+ (1− T ′ (yi)) yiδi
ˆ 1
0
Γijδj
[
εS,wj
wˆEj
wj
− εS,rj
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj) + ε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
]
dj − Tˆ (yi) ,
which implies
0 = (1− T ′ (yi)) yiδi
[
wˆEi
wi
+
ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,w
j
wˆEj
wj
dj
]
+δi
εS,ri
εDi
yiTˆ
′ (yi)− δi
(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)
Tˆ (yi)
−δi
ˆ 1
0
Γijδj
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
[
εS,rj yj Tˆ
′ (yj)− εS,nj Tˆ (yj)
]
dj.
This concludes the proof.
We now derive the closed-form solution to equation (44).
Proof of Theorem 1. There is a one-to-one map i 7→ yi, so that we can deﬁne εDyi = εDi , εS,xyi =
εS,xi for x ∈ {r, w, n}, δyi = δi, τyi,yj = τij , ΩˆEyi = ΩˆEi , and γyi,yj = γijdyj/dj , Γyi,yj =
Γij
dyj/dj
. Changing
variables from i to yi in equation (44) then leads to
Tˆ ′ (yi)−
(
εS,wyi + ε
S,n
yi + ε
D
yi
εS,ryi yi
)
Tˆ (yi) = −
εDyi
δyiε
S,r
yi yi
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiA (yi) , (45)
where
A (yi) ≡ ΩˆEyi − δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjδyj
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
[
εS,ryj yj Tˆ
′ (yj)− εS,nyj Tˆ (yj)
]
dyj . (46)
Equation (45) is a ﬁrst-order ordinary diﬀerential equation. Using standard techniques and using
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the deﬁnition εS,wyi = (1− p (yi)) εS,ryi + εS,nyi , we can express its general solution (up to a constant
c0) as
Tˆ (yi) =
ˆ y¯
yi
εDyj
δyjε
S,r
yj yj
e
− ´ yjyi
(
1−p(yk)+
εDyk
+2ε
S,n
yk
ε
S,r
yk
)
dyk
yk
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjA (yj) dyj
=
ˆ y¯
yi
εDyj
δyjε
S,r
yj yj
e
− ´ yjyi
εDyk
+2ε
S,n
yk
ε
S,r
yk
dyk
yk (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj (1− T
′ (yj)) yjA (yj) dyj
≡ (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yjA (yj) dyj . (47)
where the second equality uses the deﬁnition p(yk)yk =
T ′′(yk)
1−T ′(yk) and integrates this expression. (We
can show that, if the baseline tax schedule is Pareto eﬃcient, all of the compensating reforms indexed
by the constant c0 have the same impact on the government budget, so that we can pick c0 = 0.)
Using (45) and (47), we can rewrite that auxiliary function A (y) as
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi − δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjδyj
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj
[
−ε
D
yj
δyj
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjA (yj) +
(
εS,wyj + ε
D
yj
)
Tˆ (yj)
]
dyj
= ΩˆEi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yj
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dyj
= ΩˆEi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − δyi
ˆ y¯
yj=y
ˆ y¯
yk=yj
Γyi,yjε
D
yjE yj ,ykA (yk) dykdyj
where the second equality uses the fact that δyj
(
εS,wyj + ε
D
yj
)
= εDyj . Inverting the order of the two
integrals in the last line implies that this expression can be rewritten as
A (yi) = ΩˆEi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjA (yj) dyj − δyi
ˆ y¯
yk=y
{ˆ yk
yj=y
Γyi,yjε
D
yjE yj ,ykdyj
}
A (yk) dyk
= ΩˆEi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
{
Γyi,yjε
D
yj −
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,ykε
D
yk
E yk,yjdyk
}
A (yj) dyj .
But this is a standard linear Fredholm integral equation, with kernel given by
δyiΛ
(0)
yi,yj ≡ δyi
[
Γyi,yjε
D
yj −
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,ykε
D
yk
E yk,yjdyk
]
.
Its solution is therefore known in closed form (see, e.g., Zemyan [2012]). Assume that
ˆ
[0,1]2
∣∣∣δyiΛ(0)yi,yj ∣∣∣2 didj < 1,
which ensures the convergence of the series
∑∞
n=0 Λ
(n)
yi,yj deﬁned in Theorem 1. We show below that
this condition is satisﬁed in the case under the assumptions of Section 1. Following analogous steps
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as in the proof of Lemma 2, we get
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
{ ∞∑
n=0
Λ(n)yi,yj
}
ΩˆEyjdyj . (48)
From equations (47) and (48), we obtain the solution to the compensating tax reform problem
Tˆ (yi) = (1− T ′ (yi)) yi
´ y¯
yi
E yiyjA (yj) dyj , leading to formula (36).
A.4 General equilibrium: Fiscal surplus
We ﬁnally derive the budget impact (ﬁscal surplus) of the wage disruption and its compensation.
Corollary 2. The ﬁscal surplus generated by the disruption and the compensating tax reform is
given by
Rˆ(wˆE) =
ˆ y¯
y
ρ (yi)
[
ΩˆEyi +
ˆ y¯
y
Λyi,yj Ωˆ
E
yjdyj
]
dyi (49)
where
ρ (yi) ≡
(
εS,wyi + ε
D
yi
)
T ′ (yi) yi fY (yi) +
ˆ yi
y
E yj ,yi
(
1− εDyj T ′ (yj)
)
yj fY (yj) dyj .
Like equation (36), formula (49) is a closed-form expression: it only depends on variables that are
observed in the current, pre-disruption, economy. The welfare gains of the wage disruption wˆE are
redistributable if and only if Rˆ(wˆE) ≥ 0. Moreover, since Rˆ(wˆE) gives the impact on government
revenue of the exogenous disruption wˆE and the corresponding compensating tax reform, it is a
useful metric for comparing the beneﬁts of diﬀerent disruptions: as argued in Section 1, we can rank
two disruptions wˆEA and wˆ
E
B by their respective ﬁscal surpluses Rˆ(wˆEA) and Rˆ(wˆEB).
Proof of Corollary 2. The eﬀect of the wage disruption and the corresponding compensating tax
reform on government budget is given by
R(wˆE) = lim
µ→0
1
µ
{ˆ 1
0
[
T (w˜i l˜i) + µTˆ (w˜i l˜i)
]
f (i) di−
ˆ 1
0
T (wili) f (i) di
}
=
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) f (i) di+
ˆ 1
0
(
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
+
lˆi
li
)
wiliT
′ (wili) f (i) di,
where f is the (uniform) density of skills in the initial economy. Using equations (34) and (35), the
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second integral in the right hand side can be rewritten as
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
[(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
lˆi
li
+
εS,ri
εS,wi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
εS,ni
εS,wi
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
f (i) di
=
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
δiε
S,w
i
(
wˆEi
wi
+
ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,w
j
wˆEj
wj
dj
)
f (i) di
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{[(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
δiε
S,r
i −
εS,ri
εS,wi
]
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
+
(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,r
j
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj
}
f (i) di
+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{[(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
δiε
S,n
i −
εS,ni
εS,wi
]
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
+
(
1
εS,wi
+ 1
)
δiε
S,w
i
ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dj
}
f (i) di.
This expression can be rewritten as
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
(
1 + εS,wi
)
ΩˆEi f (i) di
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{(
1− 1
εDi
)
δiε
S,r
i
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + δi
(
1 + εS,wi
)ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,r
j
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj
}
f (i) di
+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{(
1− 1
εDi
)
δiε
S,n
i
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi + δi
(
1 + εS,wi
)ˆ 1
0
Γijδjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dj
}
f (i) di.
Equation (44) implies that
−δi
ˆ y¯
y
Γijδjε
S,r
j
Tˆ ′ (yj)
1− T ′ (yj)dj + δi
ˆ y¯
y
Γijδjε
S,n
j
Tˆ (yj)
(1− T ′ (yj)) yj dj
= −ΩˆEi − δi
εS,ri
εDi
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) + δi
(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi .
The previous expression can thus be rewritten as
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{(
1− 1
εDi
)
δiε
S,r
i + δi
(
1 + εS,wi
) εS,ri
εDi
}
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)f (i) di
+
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
{(
1− 1
εDi
)
δiε
S,n
i + δi
(
1 + εS,wi
)(
1 +
εS,wi
εDi
+
εS,ni
εDi
)}
Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi f (i) di.
Tedious but straightforward algebra, using in particular the equality δi
(
1 + εS,wi
)
= 1+
(
1− 1
εDi
)
δiε
S,w
i ,
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implies that this is in turn equal to
−
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi) −
(
1 + εS,wi + ε
S,n
i
) Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
f (i) di
=
ˆ 1
0
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εDi
δi
A (yi) +
(
1− εDi
) Tˆ (yi)
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
]
f (i) di,
where the second equality uses equation (45). Using the solution for Tˆ derived in (47) as a function
of the auxiliary function A, and changing variables from skills to incomes, allows us to rewrite this
expression as
ˆ y¯
y
T ′ (yi) yi
[
εDyi
δyi
A (yi) +
(
1− εDyi
)ˆ y¯
yi
E yiyjA (yj) dyj
]
fY (yi) dyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
[
T ′ (yi)
εDyi
δyi
yifY (yi)
]
A (yi) dyi +
ˆ y¯
y
[ˆ yi
y
T ′ (yj)
(
1− εDyj
)
E yjyiyjfY (yj) dyj
]
A (yi) dyi
where the second equality inverts the order of the two integrals. Finally, using (36), we can rewrite
the mechanical eﬀect of the tax reform on government revenue as
ˆ y¯
y
Tˆ (yi) fY (yi) dyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
(1− T ′ (yi)) yi
ˆ y¯
yi
E yi,yj
[
ΩˆEyj +
ˆ y¯
y
Λyj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
]
dyjfY (yi) dyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
ˆ y¯
yi
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiE yi,yjfY (yi) ΩˆEyjdyjdyi
+
ˆ y¯
y
ˆ y¯
yi
(1− T ′ (yi)) yiE yi,yj
[ˆ y¯
y
Λyj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
]
fY (yi) dyjdyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
ˆ yi
y
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjE yj ,yifY (yj) ΩˆEyidyjdyi
+
ˆ y¯
y
ˆ yi
y
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjE yj ,yi
[ˆ y¯
y
Λyi,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
]
fY (yj) dyjdyi
=
ˆ y¯
y
[ˆ yi
y
(1− T ′ (yj)) yjE yj ,yifY (yj) dyj
]{
ΩˆEyi +
ˆ y¯
y
Λyi,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
}
dyi.
Collecting the terms leads to equation (49).
A.5 General equilibrium: CES production
Next we derive formula (18), i.e., the compensating tax reform in the simpler version of the model
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of Section 1. We start by stating several useful properties of this environment.
Formulas for the CES technology. All of the following properties are derived formally in Sachs,
Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016]. The CES production function implies that wages are equal to
wi = θiL
−1/εD
i
[ˆ 1
0
θjL
1−1/εD
j dj
] 1
εD−1
.
The labor demand and cross-wage elasticities (10) are respectively equal to εDi = ε
D and
γij =
1
εD
θjL
1−1/εD
j´ 1
0
θkL
1−1/εD
k dk
=
1
εD
wjLj
F (L)
,
for all i, j ∈ [0, 1], or after a change of variables,
γyj ,yj =
γij
dyj/dj
=
1
εD
yjfY (yj)
Y¯
≡ γyj .
where Y¯ denotes the average income in the economy. Moreover, we then have
Γij =
γij
1− ´ 1
0
γkkδkε
S,w
k dk
,
with δk =
1
1+εS,wk /ε
D
, so that the cross-wage elasticities γij ,Γij (resp., γyi,yj ,Γyi,yj ) depend only on
j (resp., yj). Suppose moreover the disutility of labor is isoelastic with parameter e and that the
tax schedule is CRP with parameter p, i.e., it has the functional form
1− T ′ (y) = (1− τ) y−p.
All of the labor supply elasticities are then constant:
εS,r =
e
1 + pe
, εS,w =
(1− p) e
1 + pe
,
and
Γij =
γij
1− δεS,w/εD =
γij
δ
Γyj ,yj =
1
δεD
yjfY (yj)
Y¯
,
Finally, under these functional form assumptions the progressivity term (20) is equal to
E yi,yj =
εD
δεS,ryj
e
− ´ yjyi εDεS,r dykyk = ε
D
δεS,r
y
εD/εS,r
i
y
1+εD/εS,r
j
.
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We now give the proof of formula (18).44
Proof of Proporision 2. Since all the elasticities are constant and, the cross-wage elasticities
γyi,yj ,Γyi,yj do not depend on yi, we obtain, following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition
2 above, that the kernel Λ
(0)
yi,yj of the integral equation satisﬁed by the auxiliary function A is
multiplicatively separable, i.e.,
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi + δyi
ˆ y¯
y
Λ(0)yi,yjA (yj) dyj (50)
where the kernel δyiΛ
(0)
yi,yj depends only on yj :
δyiΛ
(0)
yi,yj ≡ δyi
[
Γyi,yjε
D
yj −
ˆ yj
y
Γyi,ykε
D
yk
E yk,yjdyk
]
= δ
[
γyj
δ
εD −
ˆ yj
y
γyk
δ
εDE yk,yjdyk
]
≡ δΛ(0)yj .
The solution to this integral equation is then straightforward to obtain, and moreover, the conver-
gence conditions assumed in the proof of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed in this case. Indeed, multiplying
both sides of (50) by Λ˜
(0)
yi and integrating leads to
ˆ y¯
y
Λ(0)yi A (yi) dyi =
ˆ y¯
y
Λ(0)yi Ωˆ
E
yidyi + δ
(ˆ y¯
y
Λ(0)yi dyi
)(ˆ y¯
y
Λ(0)yj A (yj) dyj
)
=
´ y¯
y
Λ
(0)
yi Ωˆ
E
yidyi
1− δ ´ y¯
y
Λ
(0)
yi dyi
≡ λ,
where λ is a constant. We thus obtain
A (yi) = ΩˆEyi + δλ,
where, using the expressions for the cross-wage elasticities Γyi,yj and the progressivity term E yi,yj
44An alternative proof consists of diﬀerentiating the functional equation (44) with respect to yi;
since with a CES production function and CRP tax code Γyi,yj does not depend on yi, this leads to
a second-order ordinary diﬀerential equation that can be easily integrated to lead to the same result
as Proposition 2. See the NBER Working Paper version of this paper for details.
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derived above, we get:
λ =
´ y¯
y
[
γyj
δ ε
D − ´ yj
y
γyk
δ ε
DE yk,yjdyk
]
ΩˆEyjdyj
1− ´ y¯
y
[
γyjε
D − ´ yj
y
γykε
DE yk,yjdyk
]
dyj
=
1
δ
´ y¯
y
[
yjfY (yj)
Y¯
− ´ yj
y
ykfY (yk)
Y¯
εD
δεS,r
y
εD/εS,r
k
y
1+εD/εS,r
j
dyk
]
ΩˆEyjdyj
1− ´ y¯
y
[
yjfY (yj)
Y¯
− ´ yj
y
ykfY (yk)
Y¯
εD
δεS,r
y
εD/εS,r
k
y
1+εD/εS,r
j
dyk
]
dyj
=
1
δ
´ y¯
y
yjΩˆ
E
yjfY (yj) dyj − ε
D
δεS,r
´ y¯
y
[´ y¯
yj
(
yj
yk
)1+εD/εS,r
ΩˆEykdyk
]
fY (yj) dyj
εD
δεS,r
´ y¯
y
[´ y¯
yj
(
yj
yk
)1+εD/εS,r
dyk
]
fY (yj) dyj
=
´ y¯
y
[
yjΩˆ
E
yj − ε
D
δεS,r
´ y¯
yj
(
yj
yk
)1+εD/εS,r
ΩˆEykdyk
]
fY (yj) dyj
´ y¯
y
[
1−
(
yi
y¯
)εD/εS,r]
yifY (yi) dyi
,
where the third equality exchanges the order of the integrals in the numerator and the denominator.
Therefore the compensating tax reform is given by
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi))
ˆ y¯
yi
E yiyj
[
ΩˆEyj + δλ
]
dyj
= (1− T ′ (yi))
[ˆ y¯
yi
E yiyj Ωˆ
E
yjdyj + λ
εD
εS,r
ˆ y¯
yi
y
εD/εS,r
i
y
1+εD/εS,r
j
dyj
]
= (1− T ′ (yi))
[ˆ y¯
yi
E yiyj Ωˆ
E
yjdyj + λ
{
1−
(
yi
y¯
)εD/εS,r}]
.
Letting y¯ →∞ ﬁnally leads to:
Tˆ (yi)
yi
= (1− T ′ (yi))
[ˆ y¯
yi
E yiyj Ωˆ
E
yjdyj + λ
]
,
where the constant λ is equal to
λ =
1
Y¯
ˆ y¯
y
[
yjΩˆ
E
yj −
εD
δεS,r
ˆ y¯
yj
(
yj
yk
)1+εD/εS,r
ΩˆEykdyk
]
fY (yj) dyj
= E
[
yj
Y¯
(
ΩˆEyj −
ˆ y¯
yj
E yj ,ykΩˆ
E
yk
dyk
)]
.
This concludes the proof.
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A.6 Advantages of the compensation approach
We now discuss the advantages of the compensation approach taken in this paper over the more
standard optimal taxation approach taken in most of the literature (see in particular Stiglitz [1982a],
Rothschild and Scheuer [2013, 2014, 2016], Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet [2015a,b], Scheuer and Werning
[2016], Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin [2016]).
The ﬁrst advantage of the compensation approach is that we are able to derive a closed-form
formula in a very general environment, while the optimal tax formula is generally very complex and
must be solved numerically even in simple models. In particular, our formula depends only on the
evaluation of suﬃcient statistics (elasticities, income distribution) in the current , pre-disruption,
economy rather than in a ﬁctional economy where the optimal tax schedule would already be im-
plemented; it can thus be directly applied using actual data. Moreover, the response to a given
disruption (e.g., automation) is given by a reform of the actual (e.g., U.S.) tax schedule, rather than
of the optimal one, which was not implemented in the ﬁrst place  this makes the insights from our
analysis more directly policy-relevant.
The second main advantage of the compensation approach over the traditional optimal tax
approach is that it does not rely on a particular social welfare function, and is thus robust to the
choice of welfare criteria  our formula depends only on variables that are observable or measurable
in the data.
B Numerical simulations
B.1 Graphical representation of formulas (13) and (18)
We calibrate the elasticity of labor supply to e = 0.33 (Chetty [2012]), the rate of progressivity of the
initial tax schedule to p = 0.156 (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante [2016]), and the elasticity of
substitution between skills to εD = ∞ (partial equilibrium) or εD = 0.6 (Dustmann, Frattini, and
Preston [2013]). For illustrative purposes, we construct smooth wage disruptions that are normally
distributed and centered around income yi∗ (or, equivalently, around the percentile i
∗ of the wage
distribution), where yi∗ = $20, 000 or yi∗ = $60, 000.
45 We assume that at this point the wage
decreases by an amount wˆEi∗ that implies a decrease in pre-tax income of yi∗ × wˆ
E
i∗
wi∗
= $100. The
resulting pre-tax income disruption is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3. The right panel of
Figure 3 plots the respective compensating tax reforms in partial equilibrium (dashed lines, formally
derived in Proposition 1) and in general equilibrium (solid lines, formally derived in Proposition 2).
The partial equilibrium compensation shows that the decrease in the agent's average tax rate
implied by the tax reform mirrors the income loss due to the wage disruption. Recall that the initial
(pre-reform) marginal tax rates matter for the shape of the compensation via the term (1− T ′ (yi)) in
formula (13). This explains why the compensation is larger for lower incomes, because the marginal
45This approximates a Dirac disruption at income y∗. The tax reform that compensates a general,
non-Dirac, disruption is equal to the sum of the reforms that compensate the corresponding Dirac
perturbations at each income level.
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Figure 3: Wage disruptions centered at $20,000 and $60,000 (left panel) and respective
compensating tax reforms in partial and general equilibrium (right panel)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Income y in $1,000
-100
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
y
×
wˆ
E y
/w
y
Wage Disruption at $20,000
Wage Disruption at $60,000
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Income in $1,000
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
Tˆ
in
$
Tˆ PE(y)
TˆGE(y)
Tˆ PE(y)
TˆGE(y)
tax rate in our calibration is increasing with income  it is equal to 10% at $20,000 and 22% at
$60,000. As a consequence, the same pre-tax income loss of $100 translates into an after-tax income
loss of $90 and $78 respectively, so that the compensating tax reform requires respective reductions
in tax payment of $90 and $78.
This insight is also present in general equilibrium, as reﬂected by the term (1− T ′ (yi)) in
formula (18)  this implies that the peak of the general-equilibrium compensation (solid curves in
the right panel of Figure 3) is lower when the disruption aﬀects higher-income agents. However,
the general-equilibrium compensation no longer mirrors the shape of the income losses. The ﬁrst
and main diﬀerence is that the reduction in the tax payment of the disrupted agent i∗ is much
smaller than in partial equilibrium, while at the same time agents who earn an income lower than
yi∗ now also face substantial tax rebates, even though they were not initially hurt by the exogenous
disruption. These features reﬂect the progressivity term (20) in formula (18). As discussed above,
the compensation is exponentially decreasing at a rate determined by the ratio of the labor demand
and labor supply elasticities, up to the income level at which the tax reform peaks.
To understand why this is the case, suppose that the government implements the partial-
equilibrium compensation (represented by the dashed curves). Since agents with undisrupted in-
comes are not compensated, this tax reform creates large movements in the marginal tax rates around
income yi∗ , which in general equilibrium has large unintended welfare consequences. Consider for
example an agent with income just below yi∗ . His average tax rate is reduced by the after-tax
income loss that he incurs. But his marginal tax rate is also reduced, which causes an additional
welfare gain. As a result, this agent is strictly better oﬀ after the compensation than he was in
the initial equilibrium, and this gain can be redistributed. To correct this, the government lowers
the magnitude of his tax rebate and implements a reduction in marginal tax rates to achieve exact
compensation. Agents with incomes y lower than yi∗ who are not initially disrupted have both their
marginal and average tax rates reduced, with a zero net welfare eﬀect.
This reasoning leads to an exponential reduction in the tax rates  indeed, if the average tax
rate of agent y is lowered by Tˆ (y)y , his marginal tax rate must be reduced by a factor
εD
δεS,r
> 1
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times Tˆ (y)y ; but this in turn lowers further the tax bill of agents y
′ > y, whose marginal tax rate
must therefore be reduced, and so on. Note ﬁnally that the compensation peaks at a skill i** that
is strictly below that of the agent i∗ who incurs the largest disruption. Indeed, by deﬁnition the
agent with the highest tax reduction (i**) has a zero marginal tax rate change. Thus, an agent
with a slightly higher skill gets almost the same total tax rebate (the diﬀerence between the two is
second-order since Tˆ ′ (yi∗∗) = 0) and a strictly higher marginal tax rate change (the diﬀerence is
ﬁrst-order if Tˆ ′′ (yi∗∗) > 0), and hence a strictly higher compensation, explaining why we must have
i∗∗ < i∗.
Finally, as we discussed above, the compensation-of-compensation eﬀect implies an additional
uniform (in percentage terms) downward shift of the marginal tax rates. This additional correction
implies in particular a reduction in the tax rates on incomes strictly larger than that of the perturbed
agent, while these were left unchanged both in partial equilibrium and in the absence of cross wage
eﬀects. This eﬀect involves further progressivity in the tax reform, since initially the marginal rates
of the tax schedule T are increasing with income.
B.2 Details for Section 3
Evidence from the U.S.
We order skills i from the data by ascending wage wi in 1990. Since there is not an exact one-to-one
map between wages wi and earnings yi = wili in the data, we replace the estimated hours series li
with a simulated series l¯i constructed as follows. Since in our model the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the wage is constant and equal to εS,w, there is a log-linear relationship between
wages and hours, namely ln li = α + β lnwi with β = ε
S,w. An OLS estimation of the parameters
(αˆ, βˆ) in the data gives us: (i) a calibration for the elasticity parameter εS,w ≡ βˆ; and (ii) a strictly
increasing relationship between (constructed) hours l¯i = e
αˆwβˆi and (actual) wages wi. We ﬁnd that
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the retention rate, εS,r = εS,w/ (1− p) is equal to 0.47,
and the correlation between the hours li reported in the dataset and our constructed variable l¯i is
0.97.
Figure 4 plots the compensating tax reform (left panel) and average tax rate changes (right
panel) in the case where we assume that the size of the wage disruption continues to increase
linearly above $60,000 (rather than staying constant), such that agents with an income 20 times
larger face a disruption that is 3 times larger, i.e., their wage increases by 1.02% due to robots.
Compared to Figure 2, the compensating tax increases are now higher at the top of the distribution.
For individuals with incomes equal to $60,000 per year, the tax increase on agents with income
$60,000 in 1990 is equal to $327 (εD = 0.6) or $222 (εD = 1.5). This is because, as explained in
detail in Section B.1, when the wage disruption is larger at the top, the compensating tax bill below
those incomes is larger  the tax increases necessary to redistribute the income gains experienced by
the richest agents must be frontloaded via larger marginal tax rates at the bottom.
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Figure 4: General-equilibrium compensation (Scenario 2)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Yearly income (1990) 104
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Ta
x 
bi
ll c
ha
ng
e 
($)
General-equilibrium compensation (U.S.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Yearly income (1990) 104
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Av
er
ag
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
 c
ha
ng
e 
(pe
rce
nta
ge
 po
int
s)
Compensation (U.S.): Average tax rates
Finally, when the compensating tax changes have been computed by can use the expression:
R(wˆE) =
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) di+
ˆ 1
0
(
wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
+
lˆi
li
)
yiT
′ (yi) di
=
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) di+
ˆ 1
0
((
1 + εS,wi
)[ wˆEi
wi
+
wˆi
wi
]
− εS,ri
Tˆ ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)
)
yiT
′ (yi) di
=
ˆ 1
0
Tˆ (yi) di+
ˆ 1
0
[(
1 + εS,wi
) Tˆ (yi)
yi
− εS,ri Tˆ ′ (yi)
]
yi
T ′ (yi)
1− T ′ (yi)di
to compute the ﬁscal surplus.
Evidence from Germany
We now exploit the data provided to us by Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum, and Woessner [2017] for
Germany, who estimate the impact of automation on the wages of manufacturing workers between
1994 and 2014. They ﬁnd in Column 6 of Table 7 that an increase of an additional robot per worker
reduces earnings by 1.0822%. We then multiply this number by the average change in robot exposure
over the twenty-year period (deﬁned in their equation (1)) at each decile of the earnings distribution
to obtain the total income losses at each decile. These are represented in the left panel of Figure
5 (magenta curve). Since higher deciles have been more exposed to robots than lower deciles in
Germany, their income loss is higher. Finally, we use the labor income tax schedule reported in
Kindermann, Mayr, and Sachs [2017], who calibrate a CRP functional form to German data and
ﬁnd a rate of progressivity equal to p = 0.128.
Note that Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum, and Woessner [2017] do not report hourly wages and
yearly hours (they can only estimate daily wages and yearly earnings). This prevents us from
estimating the labor supply elasticity from the data directly. We therefore assume that, as in
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2017], that εS,r = 0.5. This then allows us to back out the hourly wage
disruption from the estimated earnings dispersion and apply our formulas. Indeed, using lˆili =
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εS,w[
wˆEi
wi
+ wˆiwi ], it is straightforward to show that the modiﬁed wage disruption is given by
ΩˆEi =
1
1 + ε
S,w
δ
× yˆi
yi
,
where yˆiyi =
wˆEi
wi
+ wˆiwi +
lˆi
li
is the earnings disruption. Note ﬁnally that Dauth, Findeisen, Südekum,
and Woessner [2017] are able to estimate the robot exposure at the 10th decile (about $500,000), so
that we do not have to make an assumption about the evolution of the disruption beyond the top
income of our dataset (exposure to robots is roughly constant beyond the 9th decile).
Figure 5: General-equilibrium compensation: Germany
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The solid blue curve in the left panel of Figure 5 plots the compensation in partial equilibrium,
which mirrors the income loss induced by exposure to robots. In the right panel of Figure 5, we plot
the compensating tax reform in general equilibrium for εD ∈ {0.6, 1.5}. The tax rebate is larger than
in partial equilibrium (and almost everywhere larger than the income loss due to the disruption). If
εD = 0.6, the bottom incomes should have their tax payment reduced by $286 per year (i.e., 310%
of their income loss!), while the top incomes should have theirs reduced by $776 per year (i.e., 152%
of their income loss). Finally, these ﬁgures imply reductions in the tax rates equal to 1.3 percentage
points at the bottom and 1.4 pp at the top. If εD = 1.5, the tax rebates are $172 (186% of the
income loss) and $585 (115% of the income loss) at the bottom and the top, respectively.
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